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This thesis examines the ethnic Moro conflict in the southern Philippines. The
argument herein is that the conflict between the Muslim Filipinos and the ruling
governments, both colonial and independent, is not caused by religious or ethnic
intolerance or difference. Rather, it is the result of an historical politicization of Moro
identity that, when combined with the centralization processes of President Ferdinand
Marcos, ignited a guerilla war that prevented economic growth and social stability. The
analysis suggests that the decentralization policies of the Ramos administration (1992-
1998) and the compromise between his administration and the Moro National Liberation
Front (the dominant Muslim faction) may have finally resolved the conflict. If lasting
peace has in fact been achieved, the southern islands will provide key economic and
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This thesis demonstrates that the cause of the Moro conflict in the southern
Philippines was ethnopolitical. The historical record reveals that Spanish colonization
established a geographically oriented north-south divide between Muslims and
Christians, and the American colonial government further reified that boundary through
migrations and land grants to Christians. The historically constructed enmity between the
Moros and governing forces erupted into sustained violence in 1972 when the already
politicized Moro identity was ignited by the forced centralization policies of President
Ferdinand Marcos.
After years of warfare and unwavering Moro calls for independence, the
presidential administration of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) appears to have achieved a
lasting peace between the Moros and the central government. Ramos' policies of
decentralization and regional autonomy combined with mutual concessions between the
government and MNLF resulted in a 1 996 peace agreement granting limited autonomy
and self rule to the Moro peoples.
The agreement was an outcome of both political and economic processes. It
preserves the territorial integrity of the nation while providing areas for economic
cooperation and self-government. The peace process and resultant potential for stability
have become the key to nationwide economic reform, which Ramos hopes will catapult
the country into the new century as a newly industrialized nation. Through
decentralization and the strengthening of local autonomy throughout the Philippines,
IX
Ramos has provided an opportunity for sustained economic growth and avenues for
conflict resolution through non-violent means. The byproduct of social stability and
economic growth is a renewed political and economic status for the nation within
Southeast Asia.
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The U.S. National Security Strategy highlights overseas ethnic conflict as one of
the dangers facing our nation. In his 1997 annual report to the President and Congress,
Secretary of Defense Cohen stated, "Hostile regimes, instability, and ethnic tensions
threaten American interests in key regions." 1 One such zone of tension can be found in
the Republic of the Philippines, which has a history of ethnic unrest throughout the post
World War II period. Until the presidential administration of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998),
ethnic unrest had prevented sustained economic growth, threatened democratic principles,
and undermined the diplomatic status of the nation within the region. The longest
running conflict was the century-old animosity between Muslim and Christian Filipinos.
After a 50-year lull in violence, the conflict reignited into full blown guerilla war in 1972
and continued into the 1990's.
Muslim Filipinos ("Moros")2 are the dominant minority in Philippine society and
represent about five percent of the total national population. They have lived
predominantly on the southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago for hundreds
of years, and never fully recognized rule by any authority outside the Islamic datu system.
The Moros fought against rule by Spanish and American colonizers, and ultimately
1
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1997), vii.
2
"Moro" is a term first coined by the Spanish who thought the indigenous peoples of the southern islands
resembled the Moors ofNorth Africa.
1
against authority of the independent Philippine government. Previous colonial and
Filipino administrations have attempted to end Moro unrest by both force and
negotiation, but neither were successful. After decades of warfare and unwavering Moro
calls for independence, negotiation finally paid off after the 1 992 election of President
Fidel Ramos. In 1996 the dominant Muslim group, the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), signed a peace agreement with the Ramos administration which granted limited
autonomy and self rule by the Moro peoples.
The agreement was an outcome of both political and economic
developments/processes. It preserves the territorial integrity of the nation while
providing meaningful initiatives toward economic cooperation and self-government. The
peace process and resultant potential for stability have become the key to economic
reform, which Ramos hopes will catapult the country into the new century as a newly
industrialized nation. Through decentralization and the strengthening of local autonomy
throughout the Philippines, Ramos has provided an opportunity for sustained economic
growth and avenues for conflict resolution through non-violent means. The byproduct of
social stability and economic growth is a renewed political and economic status for the
nation within Southeast Asia.
An understanding of the roots of Moro unrest and the steps which led to the 1 996
peace treaty provide a basis for understanding the nature of the Moro conflict. By
devoting proper attention to the historical aspects of Moro unrest, one can check any
tendencies to seek purely ethno-religious explanations for the centuries of violence. I will
demonstrate that the origins of the Moro conflict are not found solely in religion and/or
colonization, but rather in several inter-related factors which led to the politicization of
Moro identity.
I will examine the history of Muslim Filipinos within the contextual framework of
events that politicized Moro identity and then led to conflict and eventually compromise
with the Manila-based governments. Specifically, I look to answer what caused ethnic
conflict in the Philippines, and what brought about cessation of this conflict.
In answering my first research question, I will demonstrate that cause of the Moro
conflict in the southern Philippines was ethnopolitical. More specifically, government
policies of the Spanish and U.S. colonial regimes as well as the post-independence
Filipino regimes politicized Moro identity and ignited the potential for ethnic conflict.
Spanish colonizers established a geographically oriented north-south divide between
Muslims and Christians, and the American colonial government further reified that
boundary through migrations and land grants to Christians. After independence the
historically-constructed enmity between the Moros and Manila erupted into sustained
violence in 1 972 when President Ferdinand Marcos tried to centralize control over
Mindanao. In answering my second question, I will demonstrate that it was not until the
decentralization and autonomy policies of the Ramos administration that peace between
the Moros and Manila government was possible.
B. GENERAL THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
Donald L. Horowitz points out in his book, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, that the
obstacles to a theory of ethnic conflict are formidable, and most current theories are
deficient and "not wholly satisfying." 3 Even an adequate definition of conflict is elusive,
although Horowitz cites a Lewis Coser definition as the most suitable description of
conflict: "a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to
neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals." 4 Horowitz notes that current ethnic conflict
theories point to three catagories of causes of ethnic conflict: tradition and modernization,
economic interest, and cultural pluralism. 5 An examination of these theories will reveal
that although they may explain certain aspects of the Moro conflict, they lack consistency
when placed upon the historical framework of the conflict that actually emerged in the
Philippines. An examination of current theories follows:
Modernization causes ethnic conflict by placing ethnic tradition on the defensive.
Although one may presume that educated minority elites and urban dwellers would move
a minority group away from traditional ethnic loyalties, the ethnicity and tradition theory
argues that minority elites who worked to protect their cultural traditions were often in
the forefront of ethnic conflicts. This is clearly the case of the Philippine Muslim elites,
who were concerned that Moro loyalties were being dispersed from family and clan to
colonizers and independent administrations. Often, according to this theoretical school,
the ethnic conflict is said to stem from earlier lapsed conflicts which are revived to fit
contemporary conditions. However, although centuries old animosities existed in the
memory of the Moro peoples, this theory cannot account for the 50-year lull in violence




Ibid., chap 3 passim.
between American colonization and the independent Marcos administration. Finally, a
fundamental assumption of modernization theories is that the minority and majority
groups will have convergent aspirations. This is clearly not the case of the Moros, who
first requested recognition as a U.S. territory and finally launched a guerilla war for
complete autonomy from the Christian north.
A second theory of ethnic conflict is the economic interest, or materialism theory.
This theory includes several variants, the first of which sees ethnic conflict as artificial. It
is presumed that "belief in the importance of distinct ethnic interests constitutes part of an
ideology (in the Marxist sense) that masks class interest and diverts the working class
from pursuing their interests." 6 Horowitz cites M.S. Prabhakar who states ethnic conflict
amounts to "challenging nonexistent or barely dangerous enemies" and avoiding the "real
issues" and the real enemies, namely "the ruling class." 7
A second version of the materialist theory focuses on ethnic conflict as a function of
working-class competition, while a third variant focuses on tensions between middleman
minorities and their host societies, each having incompatible goals which ultimately
result in conflict. None of the three economic variants clarify the case of the Philippine
Muslims. Muslim areas remain economically backward and lag behind development of
the Christian north due in large part by choice of the Muslim peoples who viewed
attempts at development and education as a Christianization process. Further, the





has been no mass employment of Muslim minorities, nor have they held a strong position
in commerce and trade when compared with Christian Filipinos. Finally, economic
theories do not explain the Moro desire for autonomy and legitimate representation that
has taken precedence over economic interests in determining their group behavior.
The last of the three main conflict theories, the plural society theory, views the
conflict as cultural rather than ethnic because culture is often the divisive line that
separates groups. The theory of cultural pluralism emphasizes dissensus and "neglects
those institutions and beliefs that are held in common." 8 Horowitz notes that the plural
society theory focuses on whole groups and ignores the specific contributions that
minority elites make to the ethnic conflict. Again, this theory will prove inadequate, as
Muslim elites have often struck deals with colonizers and the independent Philippine
government.
As none of the prevailing theories seemed to adequately explain the origins,
violence, and cessation of the Moro conflict, I turned to an examination of ethnopolitical
causations. According to Ted Robert Gurr, a group is considered a "politicized
communal group" if they meet one or both of the following criteria: first, that the group
"collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other
groups in the state." 9 Second, a group is politicized if it was the "focus of political
mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interest." 10 In the case
8
Ibid., 107.




under review in this thesis, Philippine Muslim identity was in fact politicized in each of
the three major historical periods: Spanish colonization, U.S. colonization, and finally the
independent Philippine government. This explains why ethnicity was potentially
conflictual.
Case studies conducted by Tedd Robert Gurr have suggested that western
democracies have devised strategies of accommodation that have contributed to
substantial decline in most kinds of conflict. 11 These reform strategies include the
guarantee of civil and political rights for ethnoclasses, programs to help alleviate their
poverty, recognition and resources for minority cultures and languages, and greater
autonomy and state subsidies for indigenous peoples and regional nationalists. The
resolution of the Moro-government conflict during the Ramos administration shares
many of the reform qualities that Gurr attributes to western democracies (and Japan).
Thus as Gurr points out, the conflict management strategy of concessions short of full
regional autonomy attracted substantial Moro support and undercut many of the more
militant supporters of the Moro independence movement. 12
Alternatives such as full autonomy or formation of a minority state were not
possible in the southern Philippine regions, as the dominant population in all but five of
the 23 provinces is Christian (due to the migration programs of the Americans and
independent Philippine government). Gurr argues that the political cultures of western





minority protest prompt elites to devise and apply strategies of concessions and
incorporation like those used to manage other conflicts." 13 Clearly Ramos' methodology
for resolution of conflict mirrored those used by western nations, and through reciprocal
concessions by both the government and MNLF both sides were in agreement.
C. RELEVENCE
A 1985 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report stated that within Asia,
the Philippines was "viewed as a country so closely bound to the United States by ties of
interest and sentiment as to give it a kind of dual identity— half Asian and half
American." 14 The end of the Cold War and closure of U.S. bases has not diminished the
unique relationship between the Philippines and the United States; rather, the nations
have progressed to a more mature relationship based on economic linkages, mutual
respect, and democratic principles.
Following the end of the Cold War and the reduction of U.S. military forces in
Asia, U.S. military officials began to champion a new policy of "places, not bases." This
policy allows for the continued forward presence of U.S. forces through temporary use
and/or staging of forces and logistics without a permanent presence of the U.S. military
on foreign soil. The Philippines will remain a key places of U.S. national interest within
Asia both economically and militarily. U.S. defense commitments remain in the
Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952), South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954), and Japan (Mutual Defense Agreement of 1954). Should any conflict arise in East
13
Ibid., 139.
14 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Philippines, report prepared by Dave Holiday, Jim
Dykstra, Marvin Ott, and Natalie Bocock, 94 th Cong., 2d sess., 1985, Committee Print, 3.
or Southeast Asia, the Philippines will certainly be at the front line of any U.S.
involvement. If, as Secretary Cohen stated, the United States is to remain engaged in the
region, it is in the interest of the U.S. government to continue to promote social stability
and economic growth within the Republic of the Philippines.
The Philippines has become a potent economic ally linking the United States with
the expanding economies of China, Taiwan, and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). In a 1992 statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command stated,
"We know that our own security and economic growth are now linked to the political
progress and economic growth of others. When democratic values advance and free
market ideas flourish, so do we. When democracy retreats and access to markets and
resources is closed, our nation suffers." 15 Thus, a prosperous, politically stable
Philippines ultimately benefits the United States.
The election of Fidel Ramos has resulted in social stability, economic reform, and
adherence to democratic principles. The United States has remained engaged in the
Philippines and supported the Ramos reform package through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Through education, humanitarian aid, health
assistance, and other such programs, USAID has played an active role in assisting the
Philippines toward its goal of become a model Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)
15 Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Implications ofthe U.S. Withdrawalfrom Clark and
Subic Bases, Statement by Admiral Charles R. Larson. 05 March 1992.
democracy by the year 2000. USAID has supported the new "U.S.-Philippines
partnership for democracy and development" plan which stresses shared commitment to
mutual economic interest, democracy, and "common concerns for global issues of
environmental degradation, and population." 17
The Ramos strategy may have some applicability for other nations attempting to
deal with ethnic conflicts of their own. The strategy undertaken by Ramos may apply in
cases where the minority is willing to concede full autonomy, and the government is
willing to decentralize and allow some degree of local political and economic control
within the affected region. As Gurr points out, regional autonomy is a less threatening
and less costly alternative to civil war and secession. He also notes that officials who are
prepared to compromise on the autonomy issue can generally find leadership within the
various ethnonationalist movements who are open to compromises. 18
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis focuses on two central questions of Moro identity: What caused the
Moro-Manila conflict, and what brought about cessation of the conflict? The argument
herein is that precursors to violence were a politicized identity and a forced
administrative centralization process. A politicized identity in and of itself would not
have resulted in violence, nor would centralization policies alone provided the impetus
for sustained violence. However, when the historically constructed enmity combined
16
U.S. Agency for International Development. Mission in the Philippines. Online. Available HTTP:





with the forced centralization policies of Ferdinand Marcos, it proved to be a volatile mix,
and all out guerrilla warfare erupted.
I define politicized identity as the view of an ethnic group regarding its nature and
direction in relation to the ruling majority, including the psychological identification
brought upon by forces external to that of the minority. Chapter II of this thesis explains
the politicization of Moro identity. Chapter III explains how that politicized identity
became violent and was ultimately resolved by the Ramos administration. Chapter IV
looks at the implications of the government-Moro compromise in the social, political and
economic realms. Chapter V concludes the thesis and looks to the future.
11
Map 1 : The Philippines and Southeast Asia
(Source: Waltzing with a Dictator by Raymond Bonner)
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Map 2: Mindanao, showing Regions and Principal Cities




Prior to the coming of Islam to the islands, the indigenous peoples lived as
separate, independent tribes. The fierce clan, tribe and village loyalties combined with
traditional animist worship resulted in varying degrees of devotion to traditional Islamic
beliefs, customs and rituals. After the 16th century, Spanish friars converted indigenous
peoples in the north to Catholicism and pushed the Moros southward to Mindanao Island
and the Sulu archipelago. This process established a geographically oriented north-south
divide between Muslims and Christians, which contributed to the formation of a defacto
Moro identity.
Despite the years of Moro-Spanish warfare, the Moros were never able to
overcome their varying degrees of Islamic devotion, separate tribes, separate
ethnolinguistics, and diverse geolocations to unite against their colonizers. Spanish
colonization would have two lasting effects in Philippine-Moro history. First, the
geographically oriented north-south divide between Muslims and Christians would be
firmly established; and second, Spanish colonization resulted in a zero-sum game
whereby each gain made by the government and the Church further alienated the Moros.
That alienation inadvertently created a non-Christian Moro identity, which would forever
effect the psychological identification of the Moro peoples.
The U.S. defeat of Spain in 1898 handed the United States its first overseas
colony, and launched the nation into an imperialist role. If the Spanish can be charged
15
with the creation of a Moro identity, then the Americans reified that boundary through the
implementation of a two government system— civilian for the Christians and military
for the Muslims. Nonetheless, a common thread of the colonization period and the
Manila-based commonwealth rule was the defacto establishment and entrenchment of a
politicized communal identity of the Moro peoples.
A. THE ARRIVAL OF ISLAM IN THE ARCHIPELAGO
During the seventh and eighth centuries, Islam spread from the Middle East to
North Africa and across the Indian Ocean. Eventually, Islam made its way through India,
through the Strait of Malacca, and into Sumatra and Java. Muslim seafarers from ports in
northwest India and the Middle East began to arrive in island Southeast Asia with
increased frequency, and by the ninth century, Muslim traders controlled most of the
trade routes from Morocco to China. Oppression of Muslims in China during the ninth
century led to a migration to the ports of the Malay Peninsula, where they became a
conduit for Islamic trade routes, and engaged in shipping and trade within southeast Asia.
During the tenth century, the anti-Muslim political climate in China dissipated
and many Muslim merchants from the Malay Peninsula began reestablishing ties with the
mainland. The archipelago now known as the Philippines provided a linkage in the trade
routes between India and China, and eventually gave rise to Islamic settlements in coastal
areas of the Sulu archipelago. Historical evidence shows that Arab ships, or at least ships
captained by Arabs, had reached China from the Philippine islands by the tenth century. 19
The first Muslims in the islands found indigenous peoples who were predominantly
Peter G Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad, 1974) 2.
16
animists, worshipping stones and other objects. There was no central government and the
occupants of the islands were aligned along clan and family ties.
Although it is impossible to precisely date the founding of the first foreign
Muslim colony in the islands, graves and tombstones on the southern portion of the Sulu
archipelago have been found with dates in the late thirteenth-early fourteenth centuries,
leading many to accept this period as the coming of Islam to the islands. 20 Although
Muslim contacts had become more frequent throughout Asia, it was not until the
thirteenth century that Islam became deeply imbedded in peninsular Malaya, on Java and
on Sumatra. Islam was attractive to island leaders as it offered an alternative to the Hindu
empire which had permeated the region. Islam offered the island nations equality and an
end to the caste system which had been a tenet of Hindu belief. 21 The Javanese Hindu
empire of Majapahit collapsed in the late fifteenth century, and Islam was able to firmly
establish itself throughout Southeast Asia. 22 Also by the late fifteenth century, Muslim
missionaries who accompanied the traders had arrived in the southernmost island of what
was eventually to become known as the Philippine archipelago. The missionaries
converted many local chiefs, married into powerful local families, and subsequently
brought entire clans in to the Muslim fold. 23
20
Ibid., 3.
21 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America 's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989),
40.
22 Alunan C. Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration! (Manila: R.P. Garcia, 1969), 6.
23 Gowing and McAmis, 4.
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By 1500 Islam was established throughout Sulu, and with no central government
to resist the northward push of the Sultans, Islam easily spread, and reached Manila by
1565. Islam was easily integrated into the islands' societies as the indigenous peoples
were divided into barangays (groups based upon kinship), and Muslims brought with
them an organized political concept of territorial states ruled by rajas or sultans. The
Muslim leaders exercised suzerainty over the village chiefs, and eventually, Arabic
language, writing, culture, and government became a way of life in the archipelago. 24
The degree to which Islam and its tenets were accepted among the peoples was/is
quite varied. Filipinos were divided by language, family, and tribal ties, and as such
adopted Islam with varying degrees of enthusiasm and devotion. Muslim Filipinos have
traditionally lacked any degree of solidarity beyond tribe or clan; even in modern times,
thirteen subgroups of Muslim Filipinos can be found in the southern islands. Because the
clan and family identities are the strongest loyalties among the Moros, different clans and
tribes frequently have gone to war against each other. The Moros have historically been
"fiercely proud of their separate identities, and conflict has been endemic for centuries." 25
These tribal and clan loyalties had a two pronged effect: first, Islam in the Philippines did
not generate the same cultural and institutional sophistication found in other parts of the
Muslim world. 26 Second, the distinct tribal differences and absence of a shared




26 David Joel Steinberg, The Philippines A Singular and Plural Place (Colorado: Westview Press, 1 994),
90.
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ethnologic or religious identity ultimately would prevent Moro unity of effort against
colonizers and the eventual independent government.
B. SPANISH COLONIZATION
In the fourteenth century, European demands for the spices and other products of
Southeast Asia and the Catholic Church's push for conversions led to competition for
colonies and trading bases in Asia. The Portuguese capture of trading bases in the lower
Malay peninsula, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands led King Charles V of Spain to finance
the expedition of Ferdinand Magellan in 1518. Magellan sought to find a westward
approach to the Far East and promised to bring the King the "fabled wealth of the
orient."
27
In 1521 his expedition arrived in the islands that became known as the
Philippines. Amid a series of false conversions and trickery, Magellan was killed and
only two of his original five ships returned to Spain.
Spain neglected the islands until King Charles' son, Philip, assumed the throne in
1556. Philip was determined to smash Portuguese trade in the Orient, and in 1564
directed Spanish authorities in Mexico to return to the islands as part of a grand strategy
to impede Portuguese trade in Asia.
1. Origins of Moro Angst
The expedition of 1564 was led by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, an aristocrat who
would ultimately establish the first permanent Spanish settlement on the island of Cebu in
1565. Over the next six years, Spanish pioneers departed Mexico crept into Philippine
society, established colonies and converted natives to Catholicism. In 1570, Spanish
27 Kamow, 32.
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frigates led by Martin de Gotti (an army officer) sailed into Manila Bay for meetings with
local Muslim rulers. De Gotti signed a covenant with the local Muslim chief, Suleiman,
that allowed for a Spanish settlement in exchange for protection from Suleiman's enemies
(presumably other Muslim tribes). 28 The agreements broke down following an exchange
of gunfire between the Spanish and Muslim artillery batteries. Historical accounts differ
on who is to blame for the broken treaties; some blame Spanish aggression, and others
claim Muslim provocation. 29 Regardless of where the blame is placed, Spanish troops
eventually arrived in the city and burned it to the ground. This incident planted the seeds
of Moro angst, which have continued to grow in the modern era. Disputes and conflict
continued to rage between the Moros and Spaniards as Catholic conversions increased
and the Moros were pushed southward to Mindanao and Sulu.
In 1571 King Philip designated Legazpi as governor of the islands, and he, in turn,
named the islands in honor of the King, and officially founded the city of Manila.
Sanctioned by the Church, the Spaniards converted all who were willing, while Muslims
who refused to convert fled south to Mindanao and Sulu. Although the Spanish claimed
suzerainty over the Muslim sultanates of Mindanao and Sulu, they never truly subdued
them. Many historians attribute attempts to subjugate the Moros to Spanish
Christianization, but strategic and administrative value of Mindanao must not be
overlooked. The religious rhetoric was often "inlaid in texts that also enunciate more








Nonetheless, by the early 1600's, Spain had successfully "Christianized" most
indigenous peoples, and Islam had become the faith of the minority.
Manila became the center of Spanish control, and as in other Spanish colonies,
government officials were inseparably linked to the Catholic Church. In the early years
of Spanish rule, often the only Spanish official in rural areas were the local parish priests
who established churches and schools, and thereby imbedded the Church's role into the
politics of everyday life. The Spanish government built their administrative system of
village organization by retaining the village chiefs (datus) as village headmen, and co-
opting their allegiance by guarantees of privileges and status. 31 In the later years of
Spanish rule, key families within the villages combined with an emerging economic elite
to form caciques, or those who derived power and economic status via landholdings.32
The caciques would grow in power and influence with time, and thus have a everlasting
impact on everyday life— even to the modern era.
Village structure was as far as the similarities would go for the Spanish when
compared with the methodologies of neighboring colonial powers. The colonial rulers of
neighboring states did not come with the aggressive proselytizing as did the Spanish. In
other colonial possessions in the region, the focus was not on conversion, but rather on
trade; thus, Islam lived on in these societies, and did not suffer repression as it did in the
Philippines. Where the friars and priests were the dominant political force in the
30 Thomas M. McKenna, "Appreciating Islam in the Muslim Philippines," in Islam in the Era ofNation-





Philippines, under the trade-oriented regimes in neighboring Spice Islands and Malaya,
Islam persisted. 33 As trade was the focal point of neighboring colonizers, the indigenous
peoples faced limited objection to their faith, and Islam was gradually woven into a sense
of national identity. Even in post-World War II negotiations for Malayan independence,
the British were found to nominally favor "Malay political paramountcy, by preserving
the authority of the sultans and the attendant structure of adat (custom) and shari'a
(Islamic law)." 34
The period of Moro resistance to Spanish rule is referred to as the "Moro Wars,"
which is the general name given to over 300 years of sporadic conflict between Spain and
Muslim Mindanao and Sulu. 35 The majority of "wars" were actually clashes of short
duration that took place between Spanish troops and individual sultanates, or Moro vs.
Moro intersultanate rivalries. 36 The Spanish justified attacks into Muslim territories by
blaming the Muslim pirates who intercepted trade from mainland China which was being
shipped to Acapulco via the Philippines. Muslim historians view the causes of these wars
as their resistance to Spanish attempts to rid Islam from the archipelago. In reality, both
were probably true. As trade increased, so did piracy out of the Muslim populated
southern islands, and pirates steadily attacked shipping and killed, looted, and enslaved
thousands; likewise, the tenacity of the Church in seeking new converts can hardly be
33 Amyn B. Sajoo, Pluralism in Old Societies and New States (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), 32.
34
Ibid., 43.
35 Gowing and McAmis, 27.
36 Mckenna, 46.
22
doubted. Christian Filipinos also suffered during the Moro Wars both at the hands of
their colonizers as well as the Muslim pirates. They paid heavy taxes to support
expeditions and coastal defenses against marauders, and were "recruited under the system
of forced labor to build ships for the colonial navy or to row in the galleys for Spanish
forces attacking Muslim strongholds." 37 Additionally Muslim warriors sold thousands of
Christian Filipino men, women and children into slavery in the Dutch East Indies.
Despite the years of Moro-Spanish warfare, the Moros were never able to
overcome their varying degrees of Islamic devotion, separate tribes, separate
ethnolinguistics, and diverse geolocations to unite against their colonizers. Regardless of
the cause of the fighting, whether pirates, religion, or broken treaties, Spanish
colonization would have two lasting effects in Philippine-Moro history. First, the
geographically oriented north-south divide between Muslims and Christians would be
firmly established; and second, Spanish colonization resulted in a zero sum game
whereby each gain made by the government and the Church further alienated the Moros.
That alienation inadvertently created a non-Christian Moro identity, which would forever
effect the psychological identification of the Moro peoples.
2. The Seeds of Revolution
With the exception of the Moro Wars, Spanish control of the region remained
secure until the 1880's when resentment of Spanish colonialism peaked, and calls for
37 Gowing and McAmis, 28.
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independence were inspired by the writings of Filipino nationalist Jose Rizal. 38 Rizal was
a sort of Philippine renaissance man who called for reforms of Spanish rule and political
freedom for Filipinos. In 1896, at the age of 35, Spanish authorities arrested Rizal and
tried him on trumped up charges brought upon by "reactionary Spanish priests and
officials."
39 The court found him guilty of treason and he was executed for treason later
that year. His execution would spark nationalist feelings of many Filipinos and bring
about calls for revolution.
The 1890's witnessed peak in organized Filipino insurgent groups, and by 1897
Philippine nationalists elected Philippine Army General Emilio Aguinaldo as their
president. After launching periodic insurgent operations against the Spanish, Aquinaldo
reached a truce with Spain and in December 1987 agreed to move his government into
exile in Hong Kong. While in Hong Kong, Aguinaldo initiated contacts with the
American consul-general Rounceville Wildman, and later with Admiral George Dewey,
head of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Squadron. Aguinaldo sought American support for the
Philippine revolution and also pushed for formal Philippine-American alliances in the
event of an American war with Spain. The war with Spain did come in 1898, but a
written agreement did not, and Aguinaldo was forced to rely upon America's good
intentions.
38
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The United States declared war against Spain on April 21, 1898; nine days later,
Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet at anchor. In
June, U.S. Army reinforcements were sent to Dewey for a ground assault on the Spanish
garrison at Manila. Also at this time, Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines to set up his
government and to assume command of the revolutionary forces attempting to oust the
Spanish. Less than two months after the U.S. declaration of war, Aguinaldo declared
independence for the Filipino people.
By August 1898, U.S. forces captured Manila, which by default launched the
United States into a new global role as colonizers. For the first time American soldiers
had fought overseas, and for the first time, America expanded beyond its shores; the
former colony itself was to become the colonialists.40 As Filipinos attempted to establish
a government, the Americans reinforced troops and negotiated with the Spanish in Paris
for final terms of a peace agreement. It was during this time that the first recorded
attempt of the government to strike a deal with the Moro peoples occurred. Aguinaldo
proposed that his government be empowered to "negotiate with the Muslims of Sulu and
Mindanao to establish national solidarity on the basis of a real federation with absolute
respect for their beliefs and traditions." 41 It is unknown how the Muslim leaders





By December, the Treaty of Paris was signed; it brought peace between Spain and
the United States, and allowed purchase of the former colony by the Americans, thus
transferring sovereignty over the islands to the United States. Aguinaldo protested the
transfer of sovereignty, and denounced the action in a counter-proclamation.
1. The Philippine-American War
In February 1899, less than two months after the signing of the Treaty of Paris,
fighting broke out between Filipino and American troops on the outskirts of Manila. The
leader of U.S. troops, General Otis, had ordered his troops in garrison to fire upon any
intruders.
42 On February 4th, a U.S. Army private fired upon figures in the dark who
mocked his challenge to "halt." Two days after the initial fighting, the U.S. Senate voted
to retain possession of the islands by ratifying the peace treaty with Spain.
Aguinaldo courted and eventually developed a tenuous relationship with caciques
and elite Filipinos who had emerged in the later years of Spanish rule. The elites were
composed primarily of Chinese mestizos (mixed blood), Spaniards born in the
Philippines, and Spanish mestizos. These elites were known as the ilustrados, or
enlightened ones; the AgumA&o-ilustrados alliance mobilized a large segment of the
population against the United States.
As the war slogged on, the American political machine managed to split the
tenuous alliance between the ilustrados and the provincial followers of Aguinaldo. The
ilustrados had become suspicious of Aguinaldo 's power following his return the islands,
42
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and favored a strong legislature as a means of ensuring their control. 43 The ilustrados
movement began to support the emergence of their own people as genuine alternatives to
the republican administration of Aguinaldo. With political maneuvering by the United
States, the gap between the two sides widened. An American presidential commission
arrived in the islands to appease the political factions and promised that America would
include the concerns and views of educated Filipinos in the creation of a new
government. 44 The United States emphasized the difference in class, education, and
political direction between Aguinaldo and the ilustrados. Soon, the Americans and
ilustrados were joined in a marriage of convenience. Thus by a splitting loyalties and
alliances, the United States subdued the independence movement, and captured
Aguinaldo in March 1901. The war officially ended on July 4, 1902; however, sporadic
skirmishes and battles dragged on for about ten years thereafter.
2. American Administrative Policies
Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu had never accepted Aguinaldo' s claim to
sovereignty over the entire archipelago; recognizing this, the United States encouraged
Moro demands for sovereignty in the southern islands. The United States recognized the
uniqueness of the social structure upon which the Moro society was based (i.e., the feudal
system of sultanate authority), and thus adopted a policy of indirect rule achieved via
direct negotiations. As early as 1899, U.S. Army Brigadier General John C. Bates had
negotiated an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu. The Sultan and four of his principle
43 David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search ofSoutheast Asia: A Modern History (Honolulu: University of




datus agreed to recognize U.S. sovereignty in the Sulu archipelago and also to provide
assistance to suppress piracy and apprehend persons charged with crimes against non-
Muslims. 45 The willingness of the Sultan to agree to terms of what would become known
as the "Bates Treaty" demonstrated the divisiveness among the distinct Moro tribes.
The U.S. government tasked the army occupation force to pacify "dissident
elements" and to establish law and order for the eventual integration of the Moros into
Philippine society. Army officials assured the Moros that their customs could continue,
and U.S. interference would be minimal. 46 In keeping with its policy of indirect rule, the
U.S. pledged to respect the dignity and authority of the Sulu Sultanate and promised not
to interfere with the practice of Islam. Other stipulations of the Bates Treaty included
U.S. guarantees of protection for the Sultan from foreign powers, and payment of the
salaries of certain Sulu leaders from government coffers. 47 Although the Bates Treaty
demonstrated U.S. willingness to deal with the Moros apart from Christian Filipinos
(further reifying a north-south Christian-Muslim boundaries), it must not be overlooked
that the treaty continued the historical practice of Muslim-Muslim separation; Muslim
tribes freely sacrificed the good of all Muslims in the archipelago for the perceived gain
of the individual tribes.
By the end of 1901, U.S. Army forces had begun installing outposts throughout






models for education, health and political organization in the Christian north, and
assigned military governors to the Moro provinces of Mindanao and Sulu. The American
perception of two separate and distinct peoples of the islands (i.e., Christians and tribal
non-Christians) enforced the two-government system, and led to military governorship in
the south, until such time that the Americans considered the areas were sufficiently
pacified to join the "civilianized" territories. 48 American dealings with Moro tribes were
influenced by Spanish experiences in the area, as well as neighboring colonial power
experience; however, the U.S. was most affected by its own experiences in the "wild
west."
49
Senior army officers served as governors of the region, until it was transferred
from military to civilian rule in 1914. The military governors set up agricultural colonies,
encouraged migration of non-Muslims to the island, and established an organized
education policy. 50
Also in 1901, the United States formed the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes to
govern the "minorities." All Non-Christian Filipinos were lumped into the minority
classification, and acquired legal status as "protected minorities" or "wards." 51 In 1903
the United States officially established a Moro province and placed the district governor
48
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directly charge of a newly established tribal ward system. 52 U.S. policies for the Moro
province began to diverge from that of the Bates Treaty, and by 1 904 the treaty was
abrogated by the former governor general of the Philippines, turned Secretary of War,
William Taft. With the abrogation of the Bates Treaty, the United States implemented
policies that many Moros viewed as contrary to Islam and their traditional way of life.
These policies included the merging of territories, integration of non-Muslim curriculums
in schools, and charging of customs duties, and the abolition of slavery. Slavery as an
institution played an important part in Moro society as the position of the slave is
determined by Koranic law. 53 Elaborate social patterns and the influence of the datus were
linked in many ways to the number of slaves within his court. The abolition of slavery
resulted in uprisings against the Americans led by several chiefs, who had become fearful
of restrictions on traditional powers and attempts to usurp their aristocratic authority.
After several brutal battles and the deaths of thousands of Muslim warriors in Cotabato,
Lanao and Sulu, the Moro sultanates surrendered in 1904. In the end, lack of unity,
disparate loyalties and tribal self-interest prevented any effective coordinated resistance
to American forces.
Although military might subjugated the Moros, some authors describe the
American administration of the Moro province as paternalistic, personalized, and
benevolent. These characterizations represent the vinculum between rule of the Moros
and nostalgia over the lost frontier of the United States. Others find American policies
52 Mckenna, 48.
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racist, disrespectful, and in parallel with the ill-treatment of American Indians.
Nonetheless, stated U.S. policies were designed to eventually integrate both Moros and
Christians into a common Filipino nation, but ultimately reinforced the separate
politicization of Moro identity.
a. Organization ofthe Christian Provinces
During the early years of U.S. colonization, questions began to arise in the
United States concerning administration policies in the islands. By 1904 the U.S. Bureau
of Insular Affairs had received numerous letters of inquiry requesting status reports on
U.S. accomplishments in the Philippines to date. In response to the inquiries, Mr. W.L.
Pepperman, assistant to the Bureau of Insular affairs compiled a summary of activities in
the islands for submission to the Senate chamber by the Secretary of War, W.H. Taft. 54
Included in the compilation was a description of provincial organization which clearly
distinguished the separate administration of the Christian and Muslim provinces. The
country was divided into 34 Christian provinces, five districts, and a Moro province.
The 34 Christian provinces were governed by a provincial government of
five principal officers: governor, treasurer, supervisor, secretary, and fiscal, or
prosecuting attorney; the positions of treasurer and supervisor were generally filled by
Americans. The governing board was called the "provincial board," and included the
governor, treasurer, and supervisor. The prosecuting attorney was the legal advisor of the
board and the secretary of the province represented the board's administrative arm.
54 Pepperman's response my be found in the Daniel Murray Pamphlet Collection: Library of Congress,
Available HTTP: http://memory.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/query/r7ammem/murray:@field (FLOO 1+040223 14+):
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Functions of the provincial government were threefold; to collect taxes
(via the provincial treasurer); to construct highways and bridges and public buildings; and
to supervise, through the governor and the provincial treasurer, the municipal officers in
the discharge of their duties. The governor supervised the duties of municipal officers,
and was required to visit towns of the province twice a year and hear any complaints-
against the municipal officers. The provincial treasurer collected all taxes, which were
passed on to the municipal treasurer. The supervisor was generally a civil engineer, who
carried out the work required by the provincial board.
The provincial governor was elected biennially by a convention that
consisted of counselors of every duly organized municipality in the province. The
provincial governor was then confirmed by the Philippine Commission. 35 The positions
of treasurer and supervisor were subject to civil-service law, and the positions of
secretary and fiscal were filled by appointment made by the Philippine Commission.
Pepperman reported that an election was held in 32 of the 34 Christian
provinces during February 1 904, and Filipinos had assumed governorships in all the
Christian provinces. He further reported that the remaining provincial officers, including
clerks of courts, members of boards of tax revision, etc., were filled by 86 Americans and
238 Filipinos.
' 5 The Philippine Commission was created in March 1900 by President McKinley, and consisted of
members of the U.S. legislative branch appointed by the president. The commission was created as an
instrument for the exercise of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to administer the
affairs of civil government in territory subject to military occupation. Its purpose as stated in the
Pepperman summary was to "continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing civil
government already commenced by the military authorities, subject in all respects to any laws which
Congress may hereafter enact." Ibid.
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b. Organization ofthe Moro Provinces:
Mindanao was unique not only in that its administrative make-up included
a military governorship, but its size and population density also differentiated it from its
Christian counterpart. The island is the second largest of the 7,000 or so islands that
make up the Philippine archipelago, and yet at the turn of the century was one of the most
sparsely populated. The population density of the Moro territories was ten people per
square mile while the rest of the Philippines had a ratio of 67 persons per square mile. 56
Given the size and density of the Moro province, U.S. Army control amounted to over
half of the land area of the Philippines.
In terms of land, the Moro province itself was four times larger than any
other of the provinces, and the districts were huge in comparison with many Christian
districts in the north. The Moro province consisted of Mindanao and adjacent islands,
and was divided into five districts. The Americans subdivided the districts into two
administrative bodies comprised of 14 municipalities (towns with Christian majorities)
and 5 1 tribal wards. The municipalities were organized and administered like the
Christian provinces to the north. However, the tribal wards in conjunction with the tribal
courts were to assist provincial authorities in ensuring good relations with the Americans,




The executive head of the province was the governor (an American), who
had as his assistants the provincial secretary, attorney, engineer, treasurer, and the
provincial superintendent of schools. These officers constituted the legislative council for
the government. The legislative council was granted a large measure of discretion in
dealing with the Moros and in preserving as far as possible, consistent with the act of
creating the Moro province, the customs of the Moros, the authority of the datus, and a
system ofjustice. 58
American perceptions of the Moros and motivations for separate
administration of them can best be understood by a statement of W.L. Pepperman made
in his 1904 report where he described the five Moro provinces as follows:
These provinces are populated, in whole or in part, by harmless and amiable but
ignorant and superstitious tribes. It was necessary on the one hand that these
inhabitants should be granted protection, and on the other that they should be
gradually accustomed to the ways of civilized people, which it is believed they
will readily adopt. To this end the general provincial government act has been
applied to these provinces in a modified form, under which the governor or chief
executive is appointed, as well as the other subordinate officials. 59
By 1913, American army troops succeeded in crushing the last vestiges of
resistance in a final battle with the Moro tribes. The period of the American army
administration of the Moro province (1903-1913) is seen as direct American control of
Muslim affairs. However, with the establishment of the civilian Department of Mindanao
and Sulu under the U.S. Department of the Interior from 1914-1920, administration of the
8
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region can be viewed as a weak attempt to integrate Muslims into the general framework
of the colonial government, for inclusion into a unified state. 60
In December 1913, Frank W. Carpenter became the first civilian governor
of the Moro province. Although efforts were made to integrate Muslims into Philippine
national life, Carpenter appointed mostly Christians to official posts in the Muslim
region.61 Carpenter and his successors were most influenced by the writings Najeeb M.
Saleeby, the first superintendent of schools in the Moro province. 62 A Christian, Saleeby
argued for a "variant of indirect rule" for Philippine Muslims, in which religion (i.e.,
Islam) would be encouraged, and the traditional rulership of the datus would be used to
unite the Moros under a "process of gradual development." 63 The datus, he argued, could
lead their peoples along a parallel path of development, akin to policies undertaken in the
north, which would lead to an administrative framework that embodied a singular sense
of Filipino nationhood. The Americans reasoned that if the Moros could be incorporated
into a single colonial administrative framework, the resultant stability and integration
would reap economic gains, for Mindanao offered vast unexploited natural resources.
Through legislation and resettlement, the nation could exploit natural resources, increase
agricultural production, eliminate tenancy, and reform the society. 64
60 Cesar A. Majul and R. Santos Cuyugan, Trends in ethnic group relations in Asia and Oceana, Minorities
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61 Domingo, 17.





By 1915, Muslim datus accepted American sovereignty through abdication
of their political power. In 1916 President Woodrow Wilson signed into effect the Jones
Law, which was to accelerate the "Filipinization" of Moroland. 65 It also empowered the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, making it the sole instrument for integrating the
minorities into the Filipino mainstream. 66 By encouraging migration to the south, the
Americans perceived that Christian Filipinos would provide a stable, unified government,
and through this, that the Moros would accept an agricultural way of life. The Moros,
however, perceived that "Filipinization" meant "Christianization" and with the exception
of several influential datus, remained leery of active participation in politics and
development programs. Despite the American goal of cohesive integration of both
societies, only a few influential datus took an active role in development projects.
American authorities adopted many recommendations of Saleeby,
including a hands-off policy toward Islam. The Protestant brand of Christianity which
the Americans brought to Moroland was not used in the pacification effort, unlike the
Catholicism of Spain. In fact, the tolerance of the Islamic way of life and a perceived
American irreverence toward "Spanish Christianity" (i.e., Catholicism) weighed heavily
in favor of American administrative policies in the eyes of the Moros. U.S. policies may
have prevented to some degree any unification of the Moros behind an Islamic rallying
point due to their tolerance of Islam. The separate and distinct beliefs between the two
colonizing powers were demonstrated as some U.S. Army troops went as far as to camp




in Catholic Cathedrals. 67 This lack of linkage between colonization and conversion was
much less disruptive for the Moros and made pacification efforts through establishment
of U.S. military rule much more successful. Also weighing heavily in the favor of the
Americans was the completion of visible, beneficial infrastructure projects such as roads,
wharves, telegraph lines, schools, hospitals, sanitation, and improvements in agricultural
techniques. Thus the Americans further opened Mindanao to trade, yet all the while it
remained a unique, separate region, with its peoples "protected" by the Americans from
potential conflict between themselves and the Catholics in the north. This "protection"
and separate administration ultimately compounded Moro isolation and left them outside
the mainstream of education and economic advancements occurring in the north.
By 1917, with the help of the local elite, the Americans had set up seven
agricultural colonies in Moroland for Muslims and Christians alike. The attempted
integration has been described by some as the first ever social engineering project as the
Americans attempted to unify mutually suspicious Christian and Muslim Filipinos.
Subjugation of the Moros and development of natural resources and
infrastructure characterized the period of American governorship. This changed as the
Americans relinquished control of the region to the Manila-based Filipino government
during the 1920's. The Moros witnessed deja vu as Catholic Filipinos, whom they
perceived as former Spanish collaborators, gained administrative control of the southern
regions. Control of Moroland came under the supervision of the Philippine legislature
via the Bureau ofNon-Christian Tribes within the Department of the Interior. The advent
67 Abinales, 53.
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of Catholic Filipino control brought the first concrete attempts at a unified Moro stand
against forced integration. In 1921, 57 prominent leaders from Sulu signed a petition that
declared, "It is the desire of the people of Sulu to be made a permanent American
territory."
68
In 1924, several Muslim chiefs, claiming to speak for nearly half-a-million
residents of Sulu and Mindanao, attempted to block Philippine independence by
petitioning authorities in Manila and Washington to regard Muslims as a separate and
different people and allow them to be governed separately from the rest of the islands.
The culmination of this effort was the "Declaration of Rights and Purposes" which
Muslim chieftains sent to the US Congress. In it, the Muslims asked that the south be
retained under American control until they could be given separate independence. 69 The
petitioners accused the northern Filipinos of inadequate representation for Muslims in
government service; forced assimilation of Muslim peoples by Christian Filipinos;
mistreatment of Muslims; and belittling of Muslim culture - accusations which would be
repeated time and time again throughout the twentieth century Philippines. 70 The
Americans did not act upon the Muslim plea for suzerainty, for, by this time they had
established a rapport with the Christian Filipinos, seeing them as the "real Filipinos.'" 1
Christian Filipinos readily accepted the American school system, administrative set-up,
68 Fowler, 54.
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and business relations. Thus, Moroland was slipped further from American concern and
was left to the control of the Philippine legislature.
When comparing the responses to Spanish and American policies in the
Philippines, the common thread of Moro history shows that lack of unity, varying degrees
of dedication to Islam, and divisive tribal loyalties remained. The Moros historically had
associated their identity with tribe first, then as Muslims, but never as "Filipino."
Through land and sea battles, and attempts at integration into the governmental
framework, the Muslims of Mindanao remained a complex array of differing loyalties. If
the Spanish can be charged with the creation of a Moro identity, then the Americans
reified that boundary; first by their racist preconception of the Moros, and ultimately by
the implementation of a two government system. Nonetheless, a common thread of the
colonization period and the Manila-based commonwealth rule was the defacto
establishment and entrenchment of a politicized communal identity of the Moro peoples.
Unfortunately for the Moros, the communal identity was not yet strong enough to
overcome the unique regional identities and tribal loyalties held by each ethno-linguistic
group.
3. Philippine Independence
As non-Muslim Filipinos settled in the southern lands, and calls for independence
of the archipelago became louder, the Moro peoples became even more divided between
those wishing to remain under U.S. governance (and desire to eventually become annexed
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by the United States) and others calling for the Moro peoples to join non-Muslim
Filipinos in the push for early independence. 72
In 1916 President Woodrow Wilson signed the Jones Law into effect which stated
the United States was determined to relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines as soon
as a stable government was established. From the passage of the Jones Law until 1934,
Filipino activists and American lawmakers negotiated independence through a number of
U.S. presidential administrations. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the
Philippine Independence Act which provided for a ten-year commonwealth period prior
to complete sovereignty. In 1935, the Philippines became a self-governing
commonwealth by electing Manuel Quezon as their first president. Quezon and his
Nacionalista Party dominated Philippine nationalism until the outbreak of World War II.
Quezon antagonized the Moros by his encouragement of Christian Filipino migration to
the southern islands. Under U.S. colonial rule the migration had been justified in terms
of developing the island's natural resources; however, under Quezon, the rationale shifted
to a Christian "improvement" process. 73 From 1917 to 1939, 46,683 persons migrated
from northern and central Philippines to Mindanao. 74 In 1939, the National Land
Settlement Administration (NLSA) was created by Commonwealth Act No. 441 in 1939.







own farms upon completion of their training. By the time the NLSA was abolished in
1950, an additional 8,300 families had migrated from the north. 75
Other than the continued southward migration, the Commonwealth Government
mainly ignored the southern islands. It is unclear where the fault may be placed for this
inactivity, whether with the government or the Muslim leadership. Certainly the Manila-
based government had become preoccupied with the transition to independence and an
uncertainty over Japan's intentions in the region. Also, political disputes between the
elites diverted the eyes of Manila from the south. Even during the World War II
occupation by the Japanese, the Moros were left much to themselves. In fact, Filipino
stories of Moro savagery may have influenced the Japanese to leave well enough alone.
Ten months after the Japanese surrender, on July 4, 1946, the Philippines gained
independence from the United States under provisions of the McDuffie-Tyding's Act of
1934. The "official" American colonial era had witnessed sustained development in
agriculture, commerce and trade. Transportation and communications had been
modernized and an American system of education, literature, and language had been
implemented.
Following independence, the Manila government accelerated the resettlement
program, and tens of thousands of Christians moved to Mindanao. By the early 1950's
the resettlement plan included thousands of Hukbalahap communist rebels who had been
offered land and settlements on Mindanao in exchange for surrender and amnesty.
Magdalena argues that as the Moros perceived their status was eroding due to the
75 B.R Rodil, The Lumad and Moro ofMindanao (London: Minority Rights Group, 1992) 12.
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Christian bias of the central government, conflicts occurred more frequently as
settlers and tribes fought over property issues. Land issues have been the single most
important source of Muslim concern. 76 George attributes the economic exploitation of
Mindanao as the single most important factor behind Muslim unrest. The land
development and mineral exploration led to trespassing on some of the most sensitive
traditions of local Muslims. 77
The Moros did not initially challenge U.S. homesteading and land distribution
policies due to the availability of excess land. However, as Christian migration continued
through the commonwealth period, land ownership became more difficult to obtain, and
would become a central grievance of the Moros following independence. Although
disproportionate land distribution began with U.S. colonization, many Muslims leaders
had negotiated land deals with both the Spanish and the Americans in order to preserve
their sphere of influence. Thus, the blame for the "backwardness" or poverty of the
Moros cannot be placed solely at the feet of the colonizers.
Colonial aggression was a major factor of Moro angst, but the lasting effect was
the politicization of Moro identity as a separate people. Magdelena indirectly supports
this supposition by citing a government study done in 1955 which attributed Muslim
rebellions to feelings of alienation, i.e., they did not feel part of the nation as a whole.
Based upon the historical record, Muslim grievances over the distribution of land and the




of the Moro peoples. Nonetheless, the displacement of Muslim occupants of tribal lands
and a Filipino version of internal colonization cemented the distinction of a separate
Moro identity, independent from that of Christian Filipinos. George notes that the
southward migration was a case of "two incompatible socio-legal systems clashing. The
local people and the settlers were not only ignorant of each other's culture; their mutual
attitudes had been poisoned by the fears and hatreds implanted in their minds by colonial
masters."
78 These feelings would later erupt into violence as the government of
Ferdinand Marcos would effectively centralize his rule through use of the Philippine
Armed Forces (AFP) and the local constabulary.
Recognizing the long-running Moro resistance to the central government, the
newly independent Philippine government implemented several education programs in
the 1950's and 1960's to assist in the development and integration of the Moros. For
example, Manila established the Commission on National Integration, Mindanao State
University, and the Presidential Assistant for National Minorities. 79 Despite the
education programs, the Moros generally believed them to represent a secularizing threat
to their children, or even worse, a vehicle for instilling Christian values. Gowing points
out that in the minds of Christian Filipinos, consciously or unconsciously, "integration"





literacy rates fell to well below those of Christian Filipinos, to the point at which some
scholars believe they are fifty years behind their fellow citizens. 81
World War II had a particular lasting effect on Philippine society that is often
overlooked. Steinberg argues that it "spawned a totally armed society, and the readiness
to resort to force has been a disturbing feature of post-independence Philippine life." 82
Elites, businessmen, politicians and provincial governors all decided they needed more
protection against banditry and dissidence, and private armies began to grow
exponentially. 83 This effect would be felt particularly in Mindanao as private armies and
armed gangs would form along ethno-religious lines during the 1970's.
Christian immigration continued through the 1960's and 1970's. Rapid
development, political violence, land and family disputes all combined for increased
violence and lawlessness in the region. The violence paralleled a growth in worldwide
Arab nationalism, which in turn fueled a Muslim revival in the southern islands. Pakistan
and Indonesia had gained independence, and oil from Islamic nations began to rise in
importance. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and other Muslim states began supporting
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III. MODERN HISTORY (1963-PRESENT)
This chapter focuses on how the Muslim-Christian conflict turned violent, and
how the policies of Fidel Ramos succeeded in ending that violence. Ultimately, the
centralization policies of President Ferdinand Marcos were the spark that ignited all out
civil war between the Moros and the Philippine government. Marcos' attempt to gain
control over Mindanao affairs and resources forced Muslim leaders to unite against these
incursions. Later, the Muslim community splintered as the disparate and diverse
ideologies surfaced among the Muslim leadership. The dominant Muslim group became
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and was led by a former political science
professor at the University of the Philippines, Nur Misuari. Misuari and the Marcos
administration negotiated a peace agreement upon which all future agreements would be
based. However, because Marcos implemented the agreement in accordance with his
own interpretations of its provisions, the agreement did not lead to lasting peace.
The "people power" movement of 1986 ousted Marcos from office and led to the
presidency of Corazon Aquino until the 1992 election of Fidel Ramos. Ramos
recognized that social stability was the key to economic development of the nation, and
immediately upon assumption of office set out to seal agreements with rebel groups.
Ramos effectively would reverse the centralization policies of Marcos and allow for
increased autonomy and devolution of political and economic power to provincial and
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regional levels. Only through this process of decentralization was a more enduring peace
agreement negotiated.
A. THE MARCOS ERA
In 1963, Ferdinand Marcos, a charismatic three-term congressman was elected
president of the Senate. In the national presidential elections of 1965, he won a decisive
victory over incumbent president Diosdado Macapagal. Early into his presidency, clues
went undetected that he would become the most corrupt leader the islands had ever seen.
Within a year, Marcos set the tone for his social policies by preventing the ratification of
the U.N.-sponsored International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. By 1968,
Marcos had opened four bank accounts at the Swiss Credit Bank in Zurich, setting the
stage for holdings disputes that continue to the present day.
Also in 1968, news broke that AFP trainers had killed at least 28 Muslim military
recruits during a mutiny at a secret training camp on the island of Corregidor. The
Muslim Filipinos presumably were being trained by the AFP as a secret army to invade
the nearby Malaysian state of Sabah. 84 As word of the killings spread, Muslims
throughout the world were outraged. Any semblance of a balance of power between state
and social forces was lost as the government lost credibility and control in Mindanao, and
social forces gained power. Many Muslims perceived that the AFP was carrying out a
genocide policy and that the government had begun an attempt to liquidate Islam. 85
84
Territorial disputes had arisen between the Sultan of Sulu and the government of Malaysia over rights to
the island following the formation of the state of Malaysia in July 1963.
85 Magdlaena, 28.
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One of the significant effects of the Corregidor killings was the formation of the
Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). This movement served as a common rallying
point with the stated goal of the formation of "Minsupala," a separate state for Muslims to
be comprised of territories in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Despite calls for a separate
state, leaders of the MIM began to realize that status as a separate state would not be
granted due to the strength of Philippine nationalism, and the dominate religion in the
southern islands had now become Christian. Christian migration to Mindanao had by
now limited Muslim majorities in only five of 22 southern provinces. 86 (The Philippine
Muslim population was generally limited to Sulu and southern Mindanao. The
population of the Philippines is about 75.5 million of which 83% are Roman Catholic and
5% Muslim.)87
Out of the Corregidor affair arose important Filipino Muslim leadership. The
killings sowed the seeds of revolution in the minds of many, including Nur Misuari, a
political science professor at the University of the Philippines. By 1972, Misuari had
become leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an organization that had
formed in 1968 with the stated objective of obtaining a separate state for Muslims. As
with the MIM, a separate state was the bargaining point from which to give way, for
ultimately, the MNLF would settle for increased autonomy.
86 The five provinces that have majority Muslim populations are Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao and Basilan; Basilan has opted not to join the ARMM.
87 Central Intelligence Agency, "Philippines" The World Fact Book, 1996. Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.odci.gOv/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/rp.htm#People, 06 September 1997.
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Misuari launched his struggle in defense of the Moros by running for a seat in the
1 970 legislature which was drafting a new Philippine constitution; he lost in a rigged
election (1970 also began the second term for Marcos). By this time, Mindanao had
become rife with gang warfare as private Christian and Moro armies killed, kidnapped
and tortured one another. Armed gangs roamed throughout Mindanao and even attacked
villages of the same ethnicity or religion if the politics of the day dictated so. Politicians
initially deployed armed gangs to ensure political power was maintained by the
Christians; however, all out warfare erupted and further institutionalized Moro-Christian
hostilities.
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Parallel to the gang warfare in Mindanao, the scene at the national level was even
more chaotic. National elections were due in November 1972, and Manila was in a
virtual state of war. 89 Bombings and sabotage spread panic, while talk of revolution and
death squads was commonplace. Fear swept the capital city as the government claimed
Maoists under the leadership of the communist New People's Army (NPA) had infiltrated
metro Manila. 90 In the south, Marcos ordered the MIM to be disbanded and sent the AFP
to enforce his declarations. Arrival ofAFP troops led to increased conflict, closure of
public facilities, economic downturn, and refugee flows out of the south. Law and order







On September 21, 1972, facing national and regional turmoil, Marcos declared
martial law. Martial law transformed the decentralized, weak state into one of
militarized, authoritarian rule. Marcos deployed troops and police forces throughout
outlying areas to enforce his dictates - one of which was the confiscation of guns. When
government forces attempted to confiscate weapons in the southern regions, Mindanao
erupted into a bloody civil war. Because the right to bear arms is sanctioned by the
Koran and is therefore considered a sacred right, Muslims refused to give up their
weapons. 91 Misuari quit his job teaching political science at the University of the
Philippines and used foreign financing to lead the MNLF into a guerrilla war, vowing to
create an independent homeland for his Moro peoples. 92 Misuari later traveled abroad for
military training, ultimately spending time in exile in Libya. 93 Foreign supporters of the
Moro cause channeled weapons to the MNLF and its military wing, the Bangsa Moro
Army (BMA) via the neighboring Malaysian state of Sabah. 94
While continuing to use force in attempts to quell Moro resistance, Marcos played
on the historic tribal and regional differences of Muslim communities. Muslim society
had remained pluralistic, and the historical ethno-cultural differences again prevented
unity of effort much as it had in the past. Having learned his military history well,
91 Claude A. Buss, Cory Aquino and the People ofthe Philippines (Stanford: The Stanford Alumni
Association, 1987) 109.
92 Richard Savill, "Filipino Muslims Win Autonomy." The Daily Telegraph 20 August 1996. Online.
Softline Information Inc. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: world. File: allwld. 01 May 1997.
93
Leifer, 160.
94 On 16 September 1963, Britain transferred sovereignty over the colony of North Borneo (Sabah) to the
new Federation of Malaysia, which has since been disputed by the Philippines.
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Marcos played upon the historical differences of the Muslim tribes and used his own
version of divide-and-rule to ensure unity of effort would not be achieved. Marcos used
bribes of money and political appointments to reel-in support of many influential Muslim
elites. The loyalties to Marcos ran deep, and one influential Muslim leader, Mohamad
Ali Dimaporo, went as far as to produce false "witnesses" that claimed that the massacre
on Corregidor never occurred. 95
The Muslim secessionist conflict peaked in 1974, with membership of 50,000 to
60,000 personnel. Dr. Patricio Abinales has stated that the MNLF, unlike the communist
party of the Philippines, "was at best a conditional unity of different Muslim language
groups as well as different factions within the general Muslim community." 96 Abinales
further stated that the degree of support for the MNLF was often dependent upon which
ethnolinguistic group one was associated with, or to which family one was related.
Historical disunity again played a role for the Muslim community as membership within
the secessionist movement splintered into groups of locally-educated youth, and foreign-
trained and-educated Islamic radicals. The disparate and diverse membership in the
movement led to an unclear ideology, and ultimately stunted any growth of Moro unity in
future dealings with the government. This disunity also severed commonality of cause
within the MNLF as diverging ideology and objectives would lead to an eventual
splintering of the group. More radical elements later leaned toward the fundamental
95 G. Carter Bentley, "Mohamad Ali Dimaporo: A Modern Maranao Datu," in An Anarchy ofFamilies:
State and Family in the Philippines ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison, Wisconsin: Center for Southeast
Asian Studies University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993), 251.
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Dr. Patricio Abinales (abinales@oak.cats.ohiou.edu), "Mindanao" E-mail to John Harber
(jdharber@nps.navy.mil), 11 February 1998.
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Islamic line, while the more secular MNLF made concessions and compromised with the
government.
In order to gain resources for its secessionist war, the MNLF successfully
appealed for training, weapons and funding from wealthy Islamic states for its fight
against the government. In April 1 974, the MNLF established a central committee in
Libya, which had become one of the principle bankrollers of the group. The committee
drafted a manifesto calling for political independence for the islands of Mindanao, Sulu,
Palawan, Basilan and Tawi Tawi. Through the political savvy of Marcos (and some
persuasion by Indonesia, which Marcos had courted), conferees at the 1 974 Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC)97 in Kuala Lumpur voted that negotiations vice secession
was the answer to the Moro problem. Some Muslim groups claimed a governmental
campaign of genocide was being carried out, but Marcos successfully convinced the
majority of OIC members that his policy was one of economic development for the
advancement of the Moro peoples.
The financial drain on the economy forced Marcos to negotiate and at least give
an appearance of good will, for from 1973 to 1975, he had deployed 75-80 percent of the
AFP's combat strength to Mindanao and Sulu.98 Warfare between the AFP and the
97 The Organization of the Islamic Conference is a 56-member organization, established in September 1969
during the First Conference of Head of Islamic States and Governments, in Rabat, Morocco. It represents
more than 1.3 billion people, and its headquarters is in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The main objectives of the
Organization are to "strengthen Islamic solidarity and cooperation in economic, social, cultural and
knowledge among its members, to strengthen the Islamic Umah in striving attain their national pride,
freedom and rights, and to assist establishment of world peace and security based on justice." OIC
members include Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey.
98 Ruben G Domingo, "The Muslim Secessionist Movement in the Philippines: Issues and Prospects" (M.A.
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1995), 53.
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Bangsa Moro Army had resulted in approximately 60,000 deaths and the displacement of
over one million persons, nearly a quarter of which had sought refuge in the Malaysian
state of Sabah. In July 1975, the OIC formally recognized the MNLF and granted it
observer status. Facing newfound international support for the MNLF, the increasing
costs of the rebellion, and the possibility of sanctions by its Middle Eastern oil suppliers,
Maros pushed into high gear negotiations to weaken foreign support for the Muslim
rebels. His efforts were aided when the rebellion was temporarily curbed by an August
1976 earthquake and tidal wave that hit Mindanao and killed 8,000 persons.
The lull in violence provided an opportunity for Marcos to push for outside
assistance to solve the rebellion. It was no secret that primary financing for the MNLF
was coming from Libya and Malaysia, and as such, in 1 976, Marcos sent First Lady
Imelda Marcos to Libya to meet with Mohamar Qaddafi to request diplomatic assistance
in ending the insurgency. Qaddafi agreed, and Mrs. Marcos returned to the Philippines
with what has become known as the Tripoli Agreement. The agreement was brokered by
the OIC, and signed by the MNLF, the Philippine Government, and the OIC. The
agreement promised autonomy for 13 provinces on Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands
following a "constitutional process." History is not kind to the Marcos', but it cannot be
ignored that the principles of this agreement, brokered through the negotiation of Imelda
Marcos, would provide the foundation upon which future government-Moro negotiations
and compromises would be based.
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Scholar Claude Buss summed up the basic provisions of the Tripoli Agreement: 99
The autonomy was to include Muslim courts, a legislative assembly and
executive council, an autonomous administrative system, special regional
security forces, and representation in the central government; control over
education, finance, and the economic system; and the right to a reasonable
percentage of the revenues of mines and minerals. The Manila-based
government was to maintain responsibility for foreign policy and national
defense. The role of the MNLF forces and the AFP, and the relationships
between structures and policies of the autonomous region and central
government, were to be discussed later.
Despite the agreement, lasting peace did not come to pass, and Qaddafi continued
shipping arms to the MNLF. 100 Marcos feigned support of the Tripoli Agreement, and
proclaimed an autonomous Muslim region in March 1977. In April, a referendum was
held in the southern provinces to determine which desired to become part of the
autonomous region. As expected, only four provinces voted for autonomy (the only four
provinces with a Muslim majority). In late 1977, the agreement collapsed. Misuari
claimed that the Marcos administration had not adhered to the tenets of the agreement,
and other Muslim groups claimed government insincerity and deception. 101 Fighting
resumed, and the MNLF began to suffer additional splintering as some Muslims began to
feel Misuari was being manipulated away from the core beliefs of Islam, and more toward
Marxist-Maoist orientations. 102 Misuari denounced a chief rival, Hashim Salamat, and
"Buss, 110.
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consolidated his leadership hold. Salamat later formed the breakaway Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.
The government never fully implemented the Tripoli Agreement, and in classic
Marcos political manipulation, he checked the renewed uprisings by withdrawing troops
from the most disputatious areas and handed over control to armed factions loyal to local
Muslim warlords. The Marcos government sporadically negotiated with the Muslim
representatives, but also tried to bribe local leaders with money and key political
positions in the south. Many ultra-conservative Muslim elites supported Marcos and
remained loyal to him even into the Aquino administration. Moro-government
negotiations did not take place again until 1986 when the people power movement
toppled Marcos and elected Corazon Aquino president.
B. THE AQUINO ERA
In February 1 986, following a snap election and massive vote manipulation,
thousands of Filipinos flooded the streets of Manila to protest the continued repression
and corruption of the Marcos regime. The protests became known as "people power."
U.S. President Ronald Reagan supported Marcos throughout, and as Filipinos became
more assertive and nationalistic, the U.S. military bases began to overshadow other
aspects of the US-Philippine relationship. Anti-Marcos forces framed the bases issue as
one threatening Philippine sovereignty, and to many represented a symbol of U.S.




Over a period of four days in February 1986, the minister of defense Juan Ponce
Enrile, the acting chief of staff (Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos), and key advisors of the
opposition leader (Cory Aquino) stood firm against Marcos, ultimately ousted him from
office. The U.S. military flew Marcos out of the country to Hawaii, where he would die
in exile in 1989. The Philippine government installed Aquino as the duly elected
president on February 25, 1986. Her first act was to declare a revolutionary government
and fire constitutional officers, civil service employees, and elected officials to clear the
way for a new constitutional process. 104
Aquino moved to restore the democratic institutions which had been nullified
prior to the declaration of Martial Law in 1972. This led to the promulgation of a new
constitution that was ratified on February 2, 1987. The constitution provided for a
tripartite democratic system including an executive, legislative and judicial branch of
government. Following up on the spirit of national reconciliation, leaders of the MILF
contacted the Aquino government that they were ready to discuss peace. The official
message to the Aquino administration called for three specific goals: 105
• the establishment of cease-fire committees in accordance with the OIC;
• the creation of a committee for implementation of the Tripoli Agreement;
• an end to the Marcos governmental structures.
104 The best account of this transition is found in Mark Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle:
Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996).
105
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Despite the overtures of the MILF, Aquino chose to visit Misuari first in an
MNLF camp in Sulu in September 1986. Previously the MILF had joined ranks with
Misuari's MNLF to negotiate jointly with the government, and viewed Aquino's visit
with Misuari as inappropriate. The MILF then announced that they would not honor any
agreements between the government and MNLF. Aquino's visit ultimately legitimized
Misuari by giving him a tremendous propaganda coup, and projected him as the leader of
the Moro peoples. 106 Negotiations between the MNLF and the government began and
used the 1 976 Tripoli Agreement as a starting point from which to build. The high
profile and politically astute MNLF leadership marginalized the MILF and became the
sole representatives in peace negotiations. Outside pressure, particularly from the OIC,
began to increase on the Aquino administration to form an agreement with the MNLF,
and some members of the OIC threatened to advance the MNLF to full membership
should autonomy not be granted. 107
In January 1987 the MNLF and the government reached a cease-fire. The MNLF
relinquished its goal of complete independence for Muslim regions and accepted the
government's offer for autonomy; but nonetheless remained armed. By this time,
Muslim opposition groups had further splintered, and only the MNLF (representing about
20,000 members) agreed to the peace terms. All the while, the government attempted to
establish relations with the MILF, but by early 1987, MILF forces launched offensives
against government troops in an attempt to gain negotiating leverage. The 1987
Ibid.
'
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1989), 209.
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constitution ultimately honored the Tripoli Agreement, and provided for autonomous
regions in Muslim areas of Mindanao. At the end of 1987 Aquino created the Regional
Consultative Commission (RCC) in an attempt to maintain dialog between the
government and rebel groups in preparation for the constitutionally mandated autonomy
legislation for Mindanao. 108 Despite creation of the RCC, most of the dialog between the
government and MNLF continued to be one-to-one affairs.
Violence in 1988 and 1989 was sporadic, probably due to splits along ethnic and
personalistic lines of the Muslim separatist movements. In August 1989, the Aquino
administration approved Republic Act 6734 which created the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The affected areas of Mindanao and Sulu were given the
right to avoid membership in the ARMM if they so voted in a plebiscite. Since most
provinces had majority Christian populations, only four of thirteen provinces voted for
autonomy in the November 1989 plebiscite (two in Mindanao and two in Sulu). Many
Muslims were dissatisfied with the agreement, felt too much had been compromised, and
boycotted the vote. With the agreement in hand and apparent willingness of the
government to honor the agreements, Misuari's main rival was no longer the government
bureaucracy, but rather the breakaway MILF and its leadership. The MILF has remained
adamantly opposed to the government-MNLF agreements, and sporadic violence
continued amongst rival factions, family clans and AFP troops.
Ibid., 207.
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The first election ofARMM officials was held in February 1990, and the new
"politico-administrative" body of the ARMM was formally inaugurated in November
1990. 109 The former legal representative of the MNLF, Zacaria Candao, was elected to
the governorship and was granted limited executive powers. The functions of the
departments of public works, labor and employment, local government, social services,
etc. were transferred to Candao and his autonomous regional government. The
government authorized the ARMM to initiate and encourage direct foreign investments
for growth and development, but the lack of Moro unity and commitment to common
cause prevented the ARMM from becoming a functioning, legitimate governing body.
Autonomy for the ARMM was assisted by the Philippine Local Government Code
of 1 991 . This code downgraded the importance of national bureaucracy and
decentralized the system of administration. Local mayors and governors were granted
greater autonomy and responsibility to develop their own socioeconomic base through
self-initiative and internally generated revenue schemes. Also in 1991, the Foreign
Investment Act was passed. This act opened up previously restricted areas of the
economy and allowed 100% foreign equity in 'strategic industries' (such as mining).
Philippine government officials traveled to Arabian Gulf states in mid-year 1 99
1
to seek Arab investment in the development of the southern Philippines. The OIC voiced




Another breakaway group, the Islamic extremist Abu Sayyaf Group led by
Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, split from the MNLF in 1 991 . Their strength is about 300
mostly younger Muslims, many ofwhom have studied or worked in the Gulf states where
they embraced radical Islamic ideology. 110 As with the MILF, Abu Sayyaf has also
refused to accept the peace accords between the MNLF and government.
In sum, Aquino's place in Philippine political history is most significant in that
the structures and processes of democracy were restored. Although she could not
implement many of her campaign promises (such as land reform) and her attempts to
allow autonomy in the southern regions never came to fruition, she succeeded in
providing the foundation upon which further social and economic reform could be built.
Aquino provided a rallying point for the phalanx of people power that would change
Philippine identity and lead the nation into the next century as a truly independent nation.
C. THE RAMOS ERA
The new Philippine constitution allowed for only one six-year term of the
presidency, and Fidel Ramos emerged as the front runner in the lead-up to the elections of
1992. Filipino citizens had become frustrated about the lack of reforms and the stalemate
of party politics. As Ramos made his bid for the presidency, his campaign focused on the
need to restructure government, increase political stability and develop national unity.
The victor in the presidential race would inherit a weak state, high foreign debt, severe
110
Patterns of Global Terrorism. United States Department of State Publication 10321 "Terrorist Group
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economic problems and fragmented society torn apart by communist rebels, a right wing
military movement and Muslim separatism in the southern regions.
1. Goals of the New Administration
Ramos, a former army general and defense minister, won the election and
assumed office on June 30, 1992. He quickly gained a reputation as a diplomatic,
methodical and energetic president, and focused his government on economic growth and
social equity. His hands-on approach to administrative problem solving led to personal
intervention in numerous bureaucratic impasses which had historically bogged down the
passage of legislation. His first year was spent establishing alliances with members of
congress and laying the groundwork for governmental reforms. As a means to achieving
peace, Ramos established the National Unification Commission (NUC), and passed
Republic Act 7636, which among other things, repealed the 3 5-year-old anti-subversion
law, and effectively legalized the Communist Party of the Philippines. (The NUC would
later recommend amnesty to all rebel groups as a means to achieve peace.)
In January, 1993, Ramos rallied public support for his reform package by
launching a campaign called "Philippines 2000." Philippines 2000 is a development
program that aims to provide a focus for the government's economic and social goals and
to enable the nation to catch up to its more prosperous Asian neighbors. It is combination
of vision and strategy that calls for unity of the Filipino peoples, and the formation of a
strategic alliance among the government, business/private sector, labor, non-
governmental organizations and people's organizations in preparation for entry into the
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21st century." 1 Ramos challenged Filipinos to take control of their politics, livelihood
and culture, to ultimately shed the stigma of being the "sick man of Asia," and to enter
the new century as an industrialized country. The inflow of foreign investment became a
cornerstone of Philippines 2000, and without peace and security, the success of Ramos'
reforms was uncertain. 112 To modernize the nation through industrialization and
mechanization, Ramos had to find a solution to the social unrest.
Ramos' methodical approach to reform measures was also reflected in his
political counterinsurgency approach. Through political and legal maneuvering, Ramos
appeased many dissident groups responsible for much of the postwar social unrest. He
made peace with communist rebels by legalizing their party, then through an amnesty
program and release of prominent rebels from jail, began peace negotiations with right-
wing military rebels. A cease-fire was signed with the rebels in 1992, and their leader,
Colonel Gringo Honasan, opted for political life and was elected to the Senate in May
1995.
By 1993, Ramos achieved working majorities in both houses of Congress and
fought off Senate opposition to his reform proposals. Ramos recognized that peace in
Mindanao would provide a means to strengthen regional ties and spur economic growth,
and had promised during his campaign that his first objective as president would be to
111 Handbook for Filipinos Overseas: 3rd Edition. Online. Available HTTP: http://www.mozcom.com/
SCF/Handbook/ phil2000.html, 23 July 1997.
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stop the killing.
1 lj Holding true to his promises, he re-initiated peace talks with the
Muslim separatists and sent an emissary to Libya to meet with Misuari and members of
the OIC. Sporadic negotiations took place over the next two years, and by January 1994,
under intense pressure from Libya (the MNLF's principle bankroller), Misuari's MNLF
and the government again signed a cease-fire agreement.
With the cease-fire in hand, Ramos continued negotiations, seeking to find a
middle ground for a governing body upon which both sides could agree. This was in
accordance with the Tripoli Agreement. By the end of 1995 the two sides had agreed on
over 1 00 key issues for MNLF political integration, but neither side could agree to a
structure for a transitional body to govern Mindanao. Misuari's main objection was that
the requirement for a plebiscite would favor the Christian population, which outnumbered
Muslims two-to-one. To prevent a stalemate, Ramos sent his executive secretary, Ruben
Torres, to Dubai in May of 1996 for secret meetings with Misuari and MNLF leaders.
Torres had been a university classmate of Misuari and brought with him a deal for greater
autonomy rather than a separate state. The compromise was a five-man Commission for
Peace and Development of the Southern Philippines to oversee the areas covered by the
1976 Tripoli Agreement. Misuari was promised chairmanship of the commission and
then following a plebiscite, full autonomy would be granted to those regions which
desired representation by, and inclusion into the ARMM.
113
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2. The Agreement: Peace at Last?
The three years of formal talks ended on September 2, 1996, with the signing of a
peace accord. Misuari had stopped short of his initial demands for a 1 0-year provisional
government leading to a fully independent Muslim state. Following intercession by
Libya and Indonesia, he agreed to a two-phase implementation process for the accord.
The agreement was not a solo effort between the Philippine government and the MNLF;
Indonesian President Suharto and members of the OIC helped mediate talks during the
three years of negotiations. Many of Misuari's compatriots felt he had compromised too
much; only the MNLF signed the deal, leaving the MILF and Abu Sayyaf to continue the
violent struggle against the government. Upon the signing of the agreement, both
Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced aid to their
"Muslim brethren in Mindanao." 114 Suharto and Mahathir then set up organizations to
assist the affected area and help Mindanao seek financial assistance from the Islamic
Development Bank.
Misuari acknowledged the spirit of Muslim brotherhood, but also added there are
more pragmatic reasons: "While we acknowledge the sympathy of our Muslim brothers -
we belong to one community and have obligations to one another - the greater impulse
behind all this arises from the fact that Mindanao is one of the last great untapped
frontiers. We are rich in resources, and occupy a strategic part of Southeast Asia." 115
Suryo Sulisto, head of a Mindanao investment task force, has agreed that new peace
114
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agreement and investment potential are behind the business interest. "Up to now,
investing in Mindanao was not attractive because of the unstable political situation. But
now, the peace agreement makes investment possible."" 6
The agreement was hailed by some as the beginning of a new era of peace and
development; others viewed it as a complete sellout by each side that would usher in a
new era, not of peace, but of renewed conflict. As both Christians and Muslims were
split on support of the agreement, Ramos set out to campaign for the agreement in order
to allay fears that one side or the other would have the advantage. He reassured
Christians in the south by reiterating that they will be allowed to vote whether they want
to be included in a Muslim autonomous region.
3. The Autonomous Government of Mindanao
The first phase of the peace agreement was a three year transitional period to
create a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) encompassing fourteen
provinces and nine cities that are home to about two million Muslims. 117 A non-elected
administrative body called the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD) was formed to oversee development of the area. The SPCPD is comprised of a
five-member main council and 8 1 -member Consultative Assembly, all under control of
the president of the Philippines. The charter of this group charges it to promote, monitor
and coordinate peace and development efforts in the southern islands. (As this unit
1,6
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serves through the delegated powers of the president, its establishment was possible
without the constitutional requirement of a plebiscite.)
It was agreed that the SPCPD will always have a Muslim chairman and at least
one other Muslim member; furthermore, 44 of the 81 seats in the legislative assembly are
designated as Muslim seats, and the SPCPD chairman is to preside over the assembly. 118
Senior Indonesian diplomat Wiryono Sastrohandojo endorsed the idea of the council to
the MNLF saying, "The SPCPD will have powers derived from the Office of the
President. It is derivative power, but power just the same. What is important is you will
save money for development." 119 The five-member council is answerable to the
President and is responsible for channeling development funds from Manila and external
supporters to the region, but it does not have the power to make laws. It does however,
have the power to call on the military and police to carry out peacekeeping operations.
(Former MNLF personnel are being integrated into the Philippine National Police and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines at 1,500 and 5,500 respectively.) 120
Phase two of the agreement provides for the establishment of a new regional
autonomous government in 1 999 following a plebiscite in member provinces to
determine the geographical limits of a Muslim administration. The Philippine Congress
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will be required to amend or repeal the ARMM act of 1989 (Republic Act 6734) prior to
the plebiscite. The plebiscite of 1999 will provide no major shift in the ARMM, for if
past history is any indication, probably only the original four provinces of the ARMM
will vote to come under Muslim control.
The four provinces that formed the ARMM in the 1989 plebiscite elected Misuari
as governor of the ARMM in September 1996. Misuari was also designated as chairman
of the SPCPD, a move that hopes to bring financial backing and support from the
economic powerhouses ofASEAN (the majority of which are Muslim) as well as the rest
of Islamic world. With his dual positions, Musuari has taken upon himself the ultimate
responsibility for the success or failure of the agreements.
Opposition to the peace agreement continues from Muslims and Christians alike.
The Christian majority claims they were not included or consulted in the process and the
agreement essentially hands over almost a quarter of the country with a population of 8.6
million to Muslim former rebels. The MILF and Abu Sayyaf remain opposed to the
compromise as well, but Ramos is counting on the economic development of Mindanao
to win over opposition.
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPROMISE
The signing of the 1996 agreement was a result of compromise by both the
government and the MNLF. With the granting of autonomy and the election of Misuari
as governor of the ARMM and chairman of the SPCPD, Muslim leaders have taken upon
themselves the bulk of responsibility for success or failure of autonomy, reform, and
economic development. The presidential election of May 1998, and the ARMM
plebiscite of 1999 with both factor in the future direction ofARMM stability and
development.
A. SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
When the Philippines joined ASEAN in 1967, it entered with a strong economy
and thriving industrial work force. After twenty years of political corruption, social
unrest, and civil war, the nation had lost its reputation, wealth and status. The signing of
the 1 996 peace accord represented a dramatic shift in the balance of power between state
and social forces. Compromises by both the government and MNLF contributed to the
balance of power and led to the signing of the agreement.
By signing the agreement, the government compromised by accepting some
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement; i.e., acceptance of the principle of an autonomous
government in the south covering 14 provinces (provided they vote for inclusion in the
area of autonomy). The MNLF accepted democratic pluralism under which residents of
these areas are entitled to decide for themselves whether to be part of the autonomous
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region. Indisputably, at the anterior of peace lies economics, for the linkage between
economics and politics is strong and intimate. Through peace, all parties hope to achieve
economic prosperity. The government has made positive moves by encouraging
investment into affected areas through both tax concessions and subsidies, but uneven
development has the potential to cause political or social changes and thus stagnate
reforms. Misuari has urged Muslims to honor the peace agreement, and support national
programs, which develop the economy, democratize the system, and institute realistic
political reforms. In order for Misuari to maintain his legitimacy, positive, visible effects
must be seen in Muslim areas, and he must meet the expectations of the majority of Moro
peoples. Also, Misuari has to turn his fellow revolutionary cadres into capable
administrators for government— no easy task. His switch to politico from revolutionary
leader has the potential for compromising his leadership and stature, and already some
believe that he has fallen into the "dirty fray of politics." 121 His weakened status was
evidenced in July 1 997 when he was sent as an emissary of Ramos to initiate peace talks
with the MILF. Some MILF leadership refused to give way, feeling that dealing with
Misuari was inconsistent with their avowed position of rejection of the ARMM and
SPCPD. 122
The ARMM will face a plebiscite in 1 999, and national presidential elections will
be held on May 11, 1998. According to the constitution, Ramos will not be allowed to
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run for a second term. In late 1997, Protestants were joined by Misuari and ARMM
officials in supporting an extension of the term of Ramos; Misuari stated, "We want the
term of President Ramos extended because we can see that under his administration we
can realize the attainment of the Mindanao peace agenda." 123 The Protestants and MNLF
lost out on this issue after Catholic Bishops joined with Aquino in denouncing any move
to rewrite the constitution. Ramos subsequently stated he would not seek an amendment
to the constitution, nor would he seek a second term.
Following his announced support of Ramos for a second term, Misuari called for
an amended constitution to allow regionalized representation in the Senate; the election of
a vice president each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao; and ample representation of
Mindanao in the judiciary and the Cabinet. The MILF has called Misuari's campaign for
an amended constitution a "manifestation that he is now a full-blooded Filipino
politician."
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In February 1998, eighty-three candidates filed with the Philippine Commission
on Elections for permission to be placed on the presidential ballot, but only eleven were
declared qualified to run in the May elections. The majority of presidential candidates
have expressed their support for the "Mindanao Agenda" set in place by Ramos.
Candidates recognize Misuari's desire for more representation, including the regional
election of senators and the appointment of more Muslims to key offices. The candidates,
attempting to attract votes from the southern regions, have promised appointment of
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Mindanaoans to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the Cabinet, heads of government
departments, corporations, and the Philippine National Police and flag officers in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 125 The Mindanao Agenda also calls for the control of
mineral wealth, lands, marine and aquatic resources, and the use of lake-waters for power
generation in Mindanao by the people in the region.
The ability of Ramos' successor to continue dialog and promote investment and
business in the southern regions will probably be the telling tale of whether peace
continues. Simply put, if the people of Mindanao see growth occurring, have an
increased standard of living, and no longer feel neglected, then there is a significantly less
chance of uprisings and violence. The peace agreement does not please everyone, and
localized fighting will certainly continue, but an integrated military and police force
combined with a representative voice through national and regional bodies such as the
ARMM should be able to appease both Christian and Muslim inhabitants.
Some have suggested Ramos could play the role of senior government leader at
the end of his term, much like Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. As the final author and editor
of peace negotiations and economic reforms, "Senior Minister Ramos" could provide
significant leadership for leading the nation into the next century. Philippine House
Speaker Jose de Venecia stated that Ramos as senior statesman would assure foreign
125 Archie Monterola, "Presidential Bets OK 'Mindanao Agenda.'" The Manila Times. 24 February 1998.
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investors of the continuity of his programs. 126 De Venecia himself is a viable candidate
for the presidency as he has shepherded the Ramos reforms through congress and helped
build the ruling coalition; his support earned him the endorsement of Ramos for the
presidency. However, Misuari and the major Mindanao political organizations have
endorsed the former Philippine defense chief, Renato S. de Villa, for president.
During his last few months in office Ramos has continued to pursue peace and
reconciliation with those dissatisfied with the peace agreement. The AFP and MILF
agreed to a general cessation of hostilities July 1 997, and signed by the MILF and
government representative Ambassador Fortunato Abat. Peace talks between the
government and the MILF began in January 1 997, but repeatedly have been spoiled by
fighting between the military and rebel forces. In North Cotabato, the fighting has been
particularly intense, and has resulted in destroyed houses, burned crops and pockmarked
roads. Despite these setbacks, peace talks have shown some promise recently. House
Speaker de Venecia met with MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat in March 1998, and said
that Salamat, who has not met a national official in 20 years, agreed to expedite the peace
negotiations, and assured him that the MILF was serious about negotiating with the
Ramos administration. 127 Also, General Abat, the head of the government panel on peace
negotiations with the MILF, replaced General de Villa as secretary of defense; the MILF
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welcomed the appointment, and called it a "boosting shot" to the peace talks. 128 Abat is
well known in Muslim circles, as he was assigned as chief of the defunct Central
Mindanao Command during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Ghadzali Jaafar, the
MILF's chief peace negotiator said that naming Abat will ensure "synchronized treatment
of the peace process by the defense department and the government peace panel." 129
Nonetheless, many members of the MILF continue to call for an independent Muslim
state, and claim the peace accord between the government and MNLF was a sham. They
argue that poverty has not been alleviated, and have tried to re-ignite the conflict. 130 The
MILF is walking a delicate line; should it not make headway in negotiations with the
government and choose to launch another offensive it runs the risk of isolation by the
international investors in Mindanao, as well mainstream Islamic countries. If the MILF
expands its political following through successful appeals to the disillusioned populace
and disgruntled members of the MNLF, it could become perceived as victims of the
Christian government, and the OIC could feasibly support the organization.
The AFP appear to have learned new tactics during the battles with Muslim
forces, particularly since the election of Ramos and his willingness to combine both
military and political strategies to bring about peace. AFP leaders speak of dual
approaches, using strong military tactics on one hand, and persuasive, diplomatic and
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soci-economic approaches on the other. 131 General Abat has promised infrastructure and
development projects to areas under MILF control, and Army engineers have begun
paving roads and rebuilding schools, all in an attempt to show Manila's sincerity. 132 Both
the MILF and AFP claim defensive operations, but skirmishes will probably continue to
erupt despite the cease-fire. Since the Mindanao peace agreements were signed, an
average of two firefights per month have taken place between AFP and MILF troops.
MILF ideologies will continue to be at odds with both their fellow Muslims and
the government, and will persist as the wild card in the peace process. The government
has maintained dialog with the group, but it cannot give the MILF anything beyond that
which it has given to the MNLF. It appears the both the government and MILF have
simply opted for dialog over all-out warfare for the time being. The respite from fighting
provides an opportunity to recover from combat fatigue, but also provides a chance to
rearm should the cease-fire not hold. While the government holds out the olive branch to
the MILF, it considers Abu Sayyaf a criminal organization with little or no ideology, and
has refused to negotiate with its leaders (the group has yet to call for talks with the
government). Ramos has stated "The Abu Sayyaf cannot be compared to the MNLF nor
the MILF," since its members are considered "terrorists and criminals terrorizing innocent
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and helpless civilians...." 133 The leader of Abu Sayyaf, Ustadz Abubakar Abdurajak
Janjalani, is considered the most wanted criminal in the country and is wanted dead or
alive.
With the lull in fighting and an ongoing dialog between the government and
MILF, it appears social improvements in the southern regions will most likely continue.
Mindanao has much to offer Manila through its linkages to regional powers and untapped
resources. Manila has attempted to show concern for the welfare of the Moros through
investment and infrastructure. Recent improvements in education and health services
have resulted in three provinces of southern Mindanao (Zamboanga del Norte, North
Cotabato, and Lanao del Norte) having been reclassified from "poverty status" (low
Human Development Index) 134 by a recent Human Development Report. This
reclassification has been touted by some as proof that increased expenditures have had an
effect in some regions. Others argue the development has been concentrated outside
Muslim areas. Nonetheless, overall growth in the region's gross domestic product (GDP)
has averaged four percent since 1993, and is expected to continue in a positive
direction.
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The growth in GDP has also been felt at the national level. The corruption of
Marcos and the numerous coup attempts during the Aquino administration resulted in
significantly less free-flowing foreign capital when compared to its Asian neighbors. The
closure of U.S. military bases in 1992 resulted in a rapid decline of U.S. foreign
assistance, and increased pressure to make the economy more efficient and competitive.
Ramos inherited a sick economy compounded by unreliable power supplies, natural
disasters, and kidnap-for-ransom incidents. Having been shunned by many foreign
investors, the Aquino cabinet initiated a number of economic and administrative reforms
upon which Ramos began to build. These reforms included a privatization program, tariff
reforms, liberalization of foreign investment rules and the devolution of financial
authority to local governments. 136 Ramos pursued an activist economic policy, with a
clear intent to transform the political economy of the nation so that the Philippines would
take an active and competitive role in global and regional economics. In cooperation
with the International Monetary Fund, Ramos moved quickly to consolidate gains made
during the previous administration and to accelerate the reform process. Ramos initiated
legislative reform packages which liberalized the economy, and laid the foundation for
sustainable growth.
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Although the nation missed out on the "Asian miracle" boom of the 1980's, it has
turned out to be a blessing in disguise. The speculative frenzy that occurred in
neighboring nations and resulted in failed banks and real estate busts has not occurred
with the same intensity in the Philippines. Philippine banks have few problems finding
hard currency as millions of Filipinos working abroad continue to send back money to
their relatives, which has provided a stable and steady source of foreign exchange. The
Philippine peso has lost value, but not nearly as much as the rupiah, ringgit or bant. No
Philippine banks have gone bust, and the economy is expected to grow by more than two
percent in 1998. With a manageable trade deficit, successive budget surpluses, and tax
reforms on the way, it appears that the Philippines will continue to realize modest growth,
despite the surrounding storm.
Ramos recognized the importance of globalism, and regional economic
cooperation, but first set out remedy internal issues such as the lack of electric power, the
power of the banking monopolies and the dominance of the oligarchial system (those
persons with political influence whom Ramos felt extracted "wealth without effort from
the economy"). 137 Ramos privatized the government electric company and accelerated
power plant construction, which increased power output and ended the years of
brownouts. He then established an independent central bank, and with the backing of the
International Monetary Fund, cut import tariffs and other trade barriers. A value-added
tax on consumption was implemented and the banking industry was opened to foreign
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ownership. Monopolies in the telecommunication and airline industries were then broken
up, and build-operate-transfer concepts were implemented. Under these concepts, private
developers built projects such as roads and bridges with their own funds and were
allowed to make a profit on tolls for a set number of years. The projects are to then be
turned over to the government.
As monopolies were broken up, so too was the influence of many of the
oligarchies, whose dominance in politics and business made them unwilling to risk their
privileged position by accepting state action to get at the roots of poverty. By 1994, the
reforms that the IMF had implemented brought positive results, and the government had
eased regulations on foreign exchange and investment. Foreign money began to flow into
the stock market, and from the stock market into capital investments. Ramos began to
lead diplomatic and trade missions throughout Europe and the Middle East; traveling to
over 30 countries in his first five years as president. According to the Philippine
Department of Trade and Industry, these trips generated $22.4 billion in investments from
joint ventures. 138 As Ramos set out on a campaign for international and regional
economic cooperation, Muslim Mindanao would be a global trump card that Ramos
would play from the Middle East to his immediate neighbors in Malaysia and Indonesia.
The historically neglected Filipino Muslims would now become a key factor in the
development and globalization of the nation.
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In a March 1997 Misuari traveled with Ramos to the Middle East. Philippine
government representatives signed agreements with numerous countries for investment
and development of the southern regions. During the trip, Qatar signed an economic,
commercial and technical cooperation agreement and labor treaty; Bahrain and the
Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding to expand bilateral cooperation in
investment, manpower contracts and technology; 139 Pakistan signed an agreement for
joint military exercises, trade, and cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology.
Additionally, two Saudi companies agreed to invest in agricultural projects in Mindanao.
It appears that the Ramos administration has made effect use of the government-MNLF
peace agreement in that links with Middle Eastern Islamic nations have become a
component of the Ramos reform agenda.
2. Mindanao Development
It now seems Mindanao is set to reap the benefits of reform and compromise. The
cost of the 26-year insurgency is impossible to calculate; in terms of human life, sources
vary on the total lives lost, but the most common figure is around 120,000. About half of
the lives lost were rebels, a third were government troops, and the rest were civilians. 140
The government poured 40 percent of the annual military budget into the civil war, and
on average deployed half of its forces to the southern regions. 141 The cost to Mindanao in
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lost opportunities, destroyed infrastructure, population displacements, and continued
poverty is enormous. In terms of economic development, the region has lagged behind
the rest of the country by 20 years. 142 Ramos recognized the opportunity that peace in
Mindanao represented for the nation; the government would be able to apply resources to
investment, infrastructure, and business which had previously diverted to the war effort.
Ramos and Misuari both are counting on their agreements to bring new business and
domestic and international investment to the region. Ramos has stated, "Within two to
five years, we want SZOPAD to become an area of vigorous growth where our people -
Muslims, .Christians, and indigenous communities together - shall live in harmony in a
culture of peace, unity and prosperity." 143
Ramos described his vision for Mindanao to Time Magazine as follows: 144
• To remove from the southern Philippines the roots of dissidence, injustice and
inequity.
• To make Mindanao a progressive social, economic and political component of the
Philippines. "Mindanao has certain advantages in terms of its proximity to the more
progressive countries ofASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Brunei."
• To raise all of the people of Mindanao - Christians, Muslims and indigenous peoples
- to a level of development already achieved by many Filipinos in the Visayas and
Luzon, so that together, all Filipinos can be truly competitive in the 21st century.
The government and MNLF have reaffirmed promises to work together in pursuit
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region into a centerpiece of development and a major link to global markets. 145 Misuari
has called upon Mindanaoans to work harder to make Mindanao "a new Hong Kong."
Government-funded overhead capital such as public facilities, transport, and power
supplies have greatly improved the region's development potential. Government money
has also begun to flow into infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges, and the
private sector has been encouraged to invest in telecommunication and power projects.
From November 1996 to April 1997, the government released $1.6 billion to finance
projects in Mindanao such as airports, irrigation, schools, roads and houses.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also has
gotten involved in development projects, and in August 1997 signed an agreement with
Misuari to assist in the rebels' transformation from arms bearers to food producers and
entrepreneurs.
146 The agreement committed funding, technical assistance, and training to
encourage groups of former MNLF combatants to turn to farming instead of violence and
illegal activities as a means of livelihood. USAID pledged to initiate an Emergency
Livelihood Program to provide assistance for up to 2,000 ex-combatants in 10 different
SZOPAD area sites. The government has also launched a literacy program for about 200
former MNLF combatants and their family members.
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In February 1998, Ramos inaugurated three major electrical power projects in
Mindanao to further increase business and trade activities. The Zamboanga City plant in
western Mindanao will give the entire Zamboanga peninsula its own generating capacity.
According to Ramos, "The diesel plant will provide infrastructure support to the region's
economic growth. Through the assurance of adequate and reliable power supply, the
Zamboanga peninsula will become more attractive to prospective investors, thereby
increasing economic activities in the region." 147 With the operation of the diesel power
plant, Mindanao now has a total power generating capacity of 1,568 megawatts - more
than enough to supply the region's current needs of 920 megawatts. Projects such as
these power plants ultimately will benefit the business community by providing basic
necessities which had often been lacking. Since his election as Governor of the ARMM,
Misuari has aggressively touted Mindanao's potential for development and courted
regional and international investment. Malaysian deputy Prime Minister Ibrahim has
encouraged Malaysian firms to invest in the southern Philippines and suggested that OIC
member countries could help as well. 148 Malaysians have now become the most active
new investors in Mindanao. On May 6, 1997, the Malaysian National News Agency
reported that proposals to the SPCPD have included joint ventures for cargo and
passenger vessel services, expansion of National Steel Corporation, shipbuilding, water
supply and sewerage system, and low cost housing.
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The ARMM has begun to promote even bigger-scale investments including oil
refineries, petrochemical, shipmaking, textiles, telecommunications and agro-industrial
estates. The ARMM has offered special incentives to potential investors including
income tax holidays, imported capital equipment, tax credit on domestic capital
equipment, exemption from contractor's tax, employment of foreign nationals, and
exemption from wharfage dues, export taxes, and duty and import fees. The government
has guaranteed investors their basic rights such as repatriation of investment, remittance
of earnings, freedom from expropriation of property represented by the investment, or
requisition of investment.
The Financial Times Asia reported on April 29, 1997, that Mindanao now
accounts for 17.3% of new investments as compared to other regions of the Philippines.
Investments from Japan, the United States, Malaysia, Brunei and Middle East countries
continue to pour in, while investment and infrastructure reforms have begun to pay off.
The island's gross regional domestic product (GRDP), which had been continually
declining since 1978, began to register growth in 1993 and has since averaged more than
four percent per annum. Both investments and bank deposits in Mindanao have risen
dramatically, and construction permits have risen by 33 percent annually since 1992.
Cities that were largely unaffected by the fighting have registered twice the
national rate of economic growth due to the influx of private firms. Mindanao and the
central islands now account for 35% of the nation's GDP and many of the best
performing stocks at the Philippine Stock Exchange have operations affiliated with
Mindanao.
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Along with regional development has come concern of a short-term gain attitude
and "plunder economy" that could lead to environmental crisis. The nation had virtually
no environmental controls until the presidential term of Ramos. In the late 1980's the
World Wildlife Fund began major activities in the Philippines and by 1988 facilitated the
completion of a $2 million debt-for-nature swap program whereby portions of the
nation's foreign debt were cancelled in exchange for Philippine government sponsorship
of conservation projects. 149 In 1992, the Integrated Protected Areas System was enacted
into law and protects all national parks and other nature reserves in the nation. In 1994,
following complaints from environmentalists that illegal mining was disturbing the
ecological balance particularly in southern Mindanao Ramos ordered the agriculture
department to regulate all mineral extraction activities in the nation, "especially those that
damage the environment." 150 The National Catholic Reporter magazine reported on June
30, 1995 that "ecological action by tribal and bioregional groups organized around
Mindanao's base Christian communities has influenced the religious, social and political
consciousness of the region." 151 The groups have fought logging operations, begun
reforestation projects, established sea sanctuaries, promoted organic farming, created
community-based health programs, and campaigned against toxic waste dumps. 152
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Mindanao also offers Manila a means to finally overcome ASEAN' s common
stereotype that the Philippines was a mere puppet of the United Sates. Despite full
membership in ASEAN, the Philippines never enjoyed full faith and confidence of
member states. 153 The unique relationship with the United States separated the nation
from other members ofASEAN who perceived the government as irrevocably linked to
its U.S. colonial father. The relationship was a mark of disdain with many Southeast
Asia neighbors, particularly for Indonesia which considered that the Philippines never
proved itself worthy of independence. Many Indonesians felt that the Filipinos had never
truly fought for their freedom, but rather had it "handed to them" from the United
States.
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Marcos' quarrels with Malaysia over Sabah and the 1972 declaration of Martial
law did nothing to endear the nation to neighboring states with majority Islamic
populations. As the nation muddled along with the corrupt administration of Marcos,
neighboring countries began to realize economic growth through policies of liberalization
and privatization. These practices were accomplished through a commitment to
economic openness and active membership in regional cooperative forums such as the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Free Trade Area ofASEAN








made it imperative that if the Philippines wanted to rise in political and economic status
within the region, commitment to active participation in regional organizations and
forums had to take place.
The nation's movement toward its Asia neighbors began with the People Power
movement of 1986. People power represented a rebirth of independence for Filipinos,
and began to change previously-held perceptions that the nation was inseparably linked to
the United States. Through people power, the nation not only regained its sovereignty,
independence and sense of national self, but also sent a clear signal to its neighbors that
Filipinos had diverted their gaze away from "big brother" and had begun to chart their
own course. The rejection of the renewal of U.S. military bases was the final push to
cast-off the colonized mentality and gain final independence and sovereignty.
It appears Ramos also recognized that as a byproduct of that sovereignty, the
nation no longer had excuses for its woes. Having set his agenda for national
reconciliation in motion, Ramos thus turned the nation's eyes to their Asian neighbors.
The peace agreement has allowed the nation to use Muslim linkages in the south, as a
means to enter into regional trade linkages that would elevate the nation both
economically and politically. One such maneuver was the proposal to form a regional
growth area connecting East Asian nations for interregional trade and commerce. In
October of 1992, Ramos proposed to the leaders of Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia that
they join the Philippines in the formation of a growth area in the East ASEAN region.
The proposal was heartily received, and by 1994, the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines - East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) was formed. The agreement
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Regional leaders have thus recognized the value of growth areas and have
encouraged the formation and investment via the formation of additional "growth
triangles." Since formation of BIMP-EAGA, participating nations have held ministerial
and working group meetings every six months, and membership has expanded to a total
of 1 3 provinces including regions of Maluku and Irian Jaya, Indonesia (Indonesia is now
the largest participating country).
The goal ofBIMP-EAGA is intended not only to attract investment to Asia's "last
frontiers," but to increase trade, regional and global investment and tourism.
Governments in the region hope to build on the common history, religion and trade ties in
the EAGA by formation of an integrated economy with no borders to restrict movement
and trade.
Shortly after its formation, the group formed an East ASEAN Business Council
(EABC) to link chambers of commerce in the region which demonstrated government
realization that the growth area is market-driven and private-sector-led. 156 BIMP-EAGA
has become a prominent player in the region, and since its inception has garnered more
publicity in the public and private sectors than what ASEAN had commanded in its first
two decades. 157 EAGA governments have initiated numerous agreements for
transportation linkages, tourism development, shipping services, etc. Philippine EAGA
promoters view Mindanao island as a key jumping off point for exporters to ASEAN by




communication links, when combined with the negotiated peace settlement, has provided
the impetus for economic growth of the southern region, which in turn has fueled national
growth. Six direct shipping routes have been established between Mindanao and other
EAGA ports, and thirteen intra-EAGA air links have been established. After barely only
four years, $2.3 billion in joint venture agreements have been signed, and additional
agreements continue to emerge. 158 Direct subregional cooperation has affected positively
the nation. Even in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, Ramos' policies have
allowed the nation to weather the storm much better than its neighbors. The BBC
reported that the President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, has pledged a second
billion dollar loan to the Philippines this year to assist in improving the country's
financial system and developing its infrastructure, employment and private sector
development. 159 Wolfensohn also called the Philippine economy "fundamentally sound,"
and vastly different than that of Korea, Thailand or Indonesia. Just as these nations are
coming under IMF supervision and seeking bail-out money from the IMF, the Philippines
has exited from over 35 years ofIMF supervision.
As decentralization and autonomy have provided a means to strengthen and
intensify regional ties, internal violence in Mindanao has the potential to reduce big-ticket
investments and business. Criminal activity is on the rise in the South, and the
breakdown in law and order could pose even more of a threat to economic growth than a
"The Brunei Darussalam Indonesia Malaysia the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-
EAGA)." Online. Available: HTTP: http://www.brunet.bn/org/bimpeabc/weIcome.htm, 14 April 1998.
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"$1 Billion Loan for Philippines." BBC. 06 February 1998. Online. Available: HTTP: http://news.
bbc.co.uk:80/hi/english/ business/newsid_54000/54054.stm, 06 February 1998.
88
renewed offensive by the MILF. Dozens of people were abducted for ransom (most in
the central Mindanao region) in 1997. The AFP blames the MILF for the abductions, but
MILF leaders have reiterated their strict policy against such "nefarious activity."
Whether true or not, predatory criminal gangs with uncertain loyalties have found a
lucrative business in abduction and ransom. The incorporation of separatist soldiers into
the AFP and police forces could provide solutions to criminal activity, but by the same
token, up to 2,000 former members of the MNLF have joined the MILF out of
dissatisfaction with the peace process. The MILF has the capacity to mount a serious and
sustained offensive against military and civilian targets in central Mindanao, but the
cease-fire seems to have held thus far. Abu Sayyaf has been implicated in a number of
the kidnappings of local people in southern Mindanao, and retains some ability to disrupt
peace and development. Most likely Abu Sayyaf will remain in the background unless
violent anti-Muslim groups become active once again.
The upcoming May 1998 elections have the potential to reignite unrest if the
successor to Ramos does not continue dialog and promote investment and business in the
southern regions. For peace to continue, the best approach for the new president would
be to continue the reform process. This includes emphasis on infrastructure development
in southern regions, acceleration of trade within BIMP-EAGA, and continuous support
for the Mindanao agenda beyond the 1998 presidential elections. Growth equals stability
and guarantees support for reforms. Provided those reforms are felt by the populace, the
possibility of an uprising is significantly decreased. The agreement does not please
everyone, and localized fighting will continue, but an integrated military and police force
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with a stable governing body should be able to appease both Christian and Muslim
inhabitants.
For now, it appears the business community sees a relatively safe economic and
social environment in Mindanao and has committed itself to investment in the region.
The prospects for development seem almost limitless, but in order to sustain economic
growth of the past three years, the government needs the peace agreement to hold, and for
the opposition groups to give peace a chance. For the Moro peoples, the agreement will
provide the right to self-govern within the ARMM and without secession. For the
Christian Filipinos, the agreement provides the necessary stability whereby the
population as a whole can reap the benefits of economic growth.
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V. FUTURE/CONCLUSIONS
The roots of Moro resistance were not merely a matter of religion and/or
colonization, but rather several factors interwoven throughout history. In his book Revolt
in Mindanao, T.J.S. George states that one cannot selectively attribute religion, social
and/or economic deprivation, political manipulation, or government ineptitude as solely
the root of violence. George states that these theories were "relevant only insofar as they
were all pieces of an enormously complex jigsaw." 160
As demonstrated in this thesis, the historical record confirms that Moro identity
was politicized, first by Spanish and American colonization, and finally by the
independent Philippine government. Spanish colonization established a geographically
oriented north-south divide between Muslims and Christians, and the American colonial
government further reified that boundary through migrations and land grants to
Christians. The historically-constructed enmity between the Moros and governing forces
erupted into sustained violence in 1 972 when the politicized Moro identity was ignited by
the forced centralization policies of President Ferdinand Marcos. It was not until the
decentralization and autonomy polices of the Ramos administration that peace between
the Moros and government was achieved.
The government and MNLF both made significant concessoins in reaching the
agreement to preserve the territorial integrity of the Philippines while providing areas for
meaningful economic cooperation and self-government.
George, 11-12.
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President Ramos has called the peace process his greatest achievement while in
office,
161
and this peace is crucial to the evolution of the Philippines into a newly
industrialized nation. The Moros have symbolic religious ties and concrete economic
linkages to neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia, and peace between the Moros and the
Philippine government is the means by which the nation can seize upon that link and
grow economically.
Ramos has taken the first step to move the nation into the next century, but it is
possible that the successor to Ramos may be less committed to the reform process.
Philippines 2000 seems to have brought upon the stability and economic growth
necessary for entry into the next century as a newly industrialized nation, but the quality
of the follow-on administration will play a key role in continued economic reform and
recovery. Breakaway groups from the MNLF will remain a threat to peace, but with
economic growth and a renewed stature within ASEAN, particularly with Indonesia and
Malaysia, the nation may be able to appease opposition forces. For now, both the
government and the majority MNLF seem willing to accept and abide by the peace
agreement. However, the later part of this decade will bring national elections and an
ARMM plebiscite which will be the most likely be determinate factors for continued
stability and future economic growth.





Abinales, Patricio. "State Authority and Local Power in Southern Philippines." Ph.D.
diss., Cornell University, 1997.
Buss, Claude A. Cory Aquino and the People ofthe Philippines. Stanford: The Stanford
Alumni Association, 1987.
Bentley, G. Carter. "Mohamad Ali Dimaporo: A Modern Maranao Datu." In An Anarchy
ofFamilies: State and Family in the Philippines, ed. Alfred W. McCoy. Madison,
Wisconsin: Center for Southeast Asian Studies University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993.
Bonner, Raymond. Waltzing With a Dictator. New York: Times Books, 1987.
Dolan, Ronald E., ed. Philippines: A Country Study Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1993.
Domingo, Ruben G. "The Muslim Secessionist Movement in the Philippines: Issues and
Prospects." M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1995.
Fowler, Dennis Bryce. "The Moro Problem: An Historical Perspective." Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, 1985.
George, T.J.S. Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise ofIslam in Philippine Politics. Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Glang, Alunan C, Muslim Secession or Integration'? Manila: R.P. Garcia, 1969.
Gowing, Peter G., and Robert D. McAmis. The Muslim Filipinos. Manila: Solidaridad,
1974.
Gurr, Ted Robert. Minorities at Risk. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,
1993.
Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1985.
Karnow, Stanley. In Our Image: America 's Empire in the Philippines. New York:
Random House, 1989.
Magdalena, Frederico V., Ethnicity, Identity, and Conflict: The Case ofthe Philippine
Moros. Singapore: ISEAS, 1996.
93
Majul, Cesar A. and R. Santos Cuyugan, Trends in Ethnic Group Relations in Asia and
Oceana, Minorities in the Philippines: The Muslims. London, UNESCO, 1 979.
McDougald, Charles C. The Marcos File. San Francisco: San Francisco Publishers, 1987.
McKenna, Thomas M. "Appreciating Islam in the Muslim Philippines." In Islam in the
Era ofNation-States, ed. Robert W. Heffher and Patricia Horvatich. Hawaii: University
of Hawaii Press, 1997.
Mednick, Melvin. "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization." In The
Muslim Filipinos, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis. Manila: Solidaridad,
1974.
Miller, Stuart Creighton. Benevolent Assimilation. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982.
Parrenas, Julius Caesar. "The Philippines: Reaping the Fruits of Reform and Stability."
Southeast Asian Affairs 1997. Singapore: ISEAS, 1997.
Rizal, Jose. Noli Me Tangere. Translated by Ma. Soledad Lacson-Locsin. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1997.
Rodil, B.R The Lumad and Moro ofMindanao. London: Minority Rights Group, 1992.
Sajoo, Amyn B. Pluralism in Old Societies andNew States. Singapore: ISEAS, 1994.
Steinberg, David Joel, ed. In Search ofSoutheast Asia: A Modern History. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1985.
Steinberg, David Joel. The Philippines: A Singular and Plural Place. Colorado:
Westview Press, 1994.
Thompson, Mark. The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic
Transition in the Philippines. Yale University Press, 1996.
94
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944










4. Dr. Mary Callahan 1
Code NS/CM




5. Commander Joint Intelligence Center Pacific 1
Box 500
Pearl Harbor, HI 96860-7450
6. Office ofNaval Intelligence 1
4251 SuitlandRd.
Washington, D.C. 20395-5270
7. Central Intelligence Agency 1
Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis (APLA)
Washington, D.C. 20505
8. Department of State 1
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Washington, D.C. 20520-6510
9. LCDR John D. Harber 2
Naval Postgraduate School
2 University Circle SGC #2225
Monterey, California 93943
95
10. Dr. Patricio Abinales




11. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
2255 Kuhio Avenue, Suite 1900
Honolulu, HI 96815
12. Curator
Echols Collection
Olin Library
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853
96
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
MONTEREY CA 93943-510?
32
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
2768 00346828 1
